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Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy:
Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the
Youth Discount
Barry C. Feldt
The Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons' prohibited states
from executing offenders for murders committed when younger
than eighteen years of age. Roper found a national consensus
existed against executing adolescents based on state statutes and
jury practices.2 The Justices also conducted an independent
proportionality analysis and concluded that youths' immature
judgment, susceptibility to negative peer influences, and
transitory personality development reduced their culpability and
precluded the most severe sentence.'
Graham v. Florida' extended Roper's diminished
responsibility rationale to prohibit states from imposing life
without parole (LWOP) sentences on youth convicted of non-
homicide offenses. The Court noted that "when compared to an
adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to
kill has a twice diminished moral culpability."' Graham
prohibited a term-of-years sentence for the entire class of
juveniles6 and repudiated the Court's earlier Eighth Amendment
position that "death is different."' The developmental features
that reduced youths' culpability for the death penalty mitigated
sentences they received for other crimes as well.'
t. Centennial Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 1966; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1969; Ph.D.,
Harvard University, 1973. Jamie Buskirk, Class of 2013, provided outstanding
research assistance.
1. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
2. Id. at 560-69.
3. Id. at 570-74.
4. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
5. Id. at 2016.
6. Id. at 2030-33.
7. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8. See id. at 2027 (majority opinion); see, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent
Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 765, 765 (2011)
(noting that "the Graham Court easily applied to juvenile life without parole the
developmental conclusions that had partially underlain its earlier abolition of the
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In Miller v. Alabama' and Jackson v. Hobbs0
(Miller/Jackson), the Court extended Roper and Graham's
diminished responsibility rationale to youths convicted of murder
and barred mandatory LWOP sentences. The Court found "the
mandatory scheme flawed because it gave no significance to 'the
character and record of the individual offender or the
circumstances' of the offense and 'exclud[ed] from consideration
. . . the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors."'n
Miller/Jackson drew on the Court's death penalty jurisprudence to
require judges to make individualized assessments and
emphasized the importance of youthfulness as a mitigating factor.
This Article uses Roper and Graham's categorical treatment
of adolescents' diminished responsibility and Miller/Jackson's
focus on the "mitigating qualities of youth" to propose a Youth
Discount-a proportional reduction of adult sentence lengths.
Graham provided very limited relief-"some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release"-and Miller/Jackson required only
individualized consideration of youthfulness and culpability. By
contrast, a Youth Discount provides a straight-forward way for
legislatures to recognize juveniles' categorically diminished
responsibility and to incorporate youthfulness as a mitigating
factor in sentencing.
Part I briefly analyzes the juvenile death penalty cases
culminating in Roper. It reviews the developmental psychological
research on judgment and self-control that bolsters Roper's
conclusion that adolescents' culpability differs from that of adults.
Part II examines how Graham altered the Court's non-death
penalty proportionality framework to acknowledge the reduced
culpability of young non-homicide offenders. Part III considers
Miller/Jackson's application of the Court's death penalty
jurisprudence to repudiate mandatory LWOP sentences for
juveniles who murder, to require individualized assessments, and
to weigh youthfulness heavily. Part IV proposes a Youth Discount
to formally mitigate the sentences of all young offenders. Rather
than require judges to provide "some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release"" or to grapple with "the mitigating qualities of
juvenile death penalty").
9. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
10. 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (mem.).
11. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280,
304 (1976)).
12. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
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youth,"" state legislators should use age as a conclusive proxy for
reduced culpability and provide substantial reductions in sentence
lengths.
I. The Death Penalty and Youths' Diminished
Responsibility
States try about 200,000 youths as adults each year because
juvenile courts' jurisdiction ends at fifteen or sixteen years of age,
rather than at seventeen.1 4 States use several types of statutes-
judicial waiver, legislative offense exclusion, and prosecutorial
direct file"-to transfer another 50,000 youths annually to
criminal courts. 6 A juvenile court judge may conduct a hearing
13. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (citing Johnson v. Texas 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)).
14. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld & Donna Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal
Court, in OXFoRD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 801, 815
(Oxford University Press 2012) (describing trend to transfer more and younger
juveniles to criminal court) [hereinafter Feld & Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles];
EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 5 (2007), available at
http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication-pdfljustice-for-some.pdf
(reporting that in thirteen states, juveniles sixteen and seventeen years of age
automatically are in criminal court because of jurisdictional age thresholds); see
also CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, THE CONSEQUENCES AREN'T MINOR 6 (2006),
available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR-
ConsequencesMinor.pdf (declaring that in some states in which juvenile court
jurisdiction ends at sixteen or seventeen years of age, the vast majority of youths
(seventy to ninety-six percent) are prosecuted for non-violent offenses); HOWARD
SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS 110-16 (2006) (chronicling states' age jurisdiction of juvenile courts).
15. PATRICK GRIFFIN, PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, TRYING JUVENILES
AS ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT 3-11 (1998); see also Feld & Bishop, Transfer of
Juveniles, supra note 14, at 815-25 (summarizing and describing transfer
mechanisms); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
471, 488 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes]; Patrick Griffin, Legal
Boundaries Between Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems in the United States, in
FROM JUVENILE DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME 184, 187-99 (Rolf Loeber & David
P. Farrington eds., 2012); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 112-14
(discussing judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, and statutory offense exclusion
as three legislative methods to transfer juveniles for criminal prosecution); Amanda
M. Kellar, They're Just Kids: Does Incarcerating Juveniles with Adults Violate the
Eighth Amendment?, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 155, 163 (2006) ("While state
legislatures generally follow three basic juvenile transfer models, many states
combine them, resulting in unique variations."); Ellen Marrus & Irene Merker
Rosenberg, After Roper v. Simmons: Keeping Kids Out of Adult Criminal Court, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1151, 1172-79 (2005) (describing details of states' judicial,
prosecutorial, and legislative waiver provisions); Enrico Pagnanelli, Children as
Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper
v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 181-83 (2007) (depicting legislative changes
in waiver laws in the 1990s).
16. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES 19 n.30
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and waive jurisdiction if she finds that a youth is not amenable to
treatment or poses a threat to public safety." Legislatures may
exclude serious offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction and
youths charged with those crimes are tried in criminal court
without any hearing. A dozen states give prosecutors discretion
to direct file or charge some youths in either juvenile or criminal
court without any review of their forum-selection decision. 9
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, states adopted get-tough
laws to transfer more and younger juveniles to criminal court in
response to increases in youth violence and homicide." The
(2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/
therestoftheirlives.pdf (estimating that states tried 27,000 juveniles as adults in
1996, of whom 9,760 had been transferred from juvenile court, and 55,000 juveniles
in 2000, of whom 7,100 had been transferred from juvenile courts).
17. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966) (requiring procedural
due process in judicial waiver hearings); Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper
Deschenes, Determinants of Judicial Waiver Decisions for Violent Juvenile
Offenders, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 314, 330-33 (1990) (providing empirical
study of waiver decisions); Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 15, at 487-94
(discussing criteria trial courts consider during waiver hearings); Barry C. Feld,
Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 83, 89-90 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E.
Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative Exclusion].
18. See Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 17, at 83-98, 102-03; Benjamin
Steiner et al., Legislative Waiver Reconsidered: General Deterrent Effects of
Statutory Exclusion Laws Enacted Post-1979, 23 JUST. Q. 34, 49-50 (2006)
(describing deterrent rationale of legislative offense exclusion and reporting that
adoption of such laws has no effect).
19. Griffin, supra note 15, at 191-95; see also Manduley v. Super. Ct. of San
Diego, 41 P.3d 3, 33 (Cal. 2002) (upholding Proposition 21 creating prosecutorial
direct file statute against due process and equal protection challenges); SNYDER &
SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 113-14 (summarizing prosecutorial "direct file" laws);
Donna M. Bishop & Charles S. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: A
Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 281, 284-85 (1991) (criticizing administration of "direct file" laws); Feld,
Legislative Exclusion, supra note 17, at 117-19; Francis Barry McCarthy, The
Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 629, 629 (1994) (arguing that
prosecutors can act as more objective gatekeepers than either "soft" judges or "get
tough" legislators); Benjamin Steiner & Emily Wright, Assessing the Relative
Effects of State Direct File Waiver Laws on Violent Juvenile Crime: Deterrence or
Irrelevance?, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1451, 1467-68 (2006) (reporting states
that adopted prosecutorial direct file laws, analyzing juvenile arrest rates before
and after adoption, and concluding that such laws have no deterrent effect).
20. See, e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL AND INST. OF MED., JUVENILE CRIME,
JUVENILE JUSTICE, 204-09, 214-18 (2001) [hereinafter NAT'L RES. COUNCIL]; Barry
C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24
CRIME & JUST. 189, 194 (1998) [hereinafter Feld, Responses to Youth Violence];
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice
Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 966-97 (1995) [hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth];
Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative "Backlash", 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1556-58 (2003) [hereinafter Feld,
Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice]; Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment:
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narrative of a young generation of "super-predators" and
predictions of an impending blood-bath of youth violence propelled
punitive policies." States lowered the age for transfer, increased
the number of offenses excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction,
and shifted discretion from a judge in a waiver hearing to a
prosecutor making a charging decision.22 Fourteen is the
minimum age for transfer in most jurisdictions, but some states
permit waiver of youths as young as ten or specify no minimum
age, and others require criminal prosecution of children as young
as thirteen.2  By 1999, half the states had enacted mandatory
transfer provisions for some serious offenses.24 Most states have
Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 11,
31-38 (2007) [hereinafter Feld, Unmitigated Punishment]; JESSICA SHORT &
CHRISTY SHARP, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 7 (2005), available at http://www.cwla.org/programs/juvenilejustice/
disproportionate.pdf ("Between 1992 and 1999, 49 states and the District of
Columbia passed laws making it easier for juveniles to be tried as adults through
statutory exclusion, mandatory waiver, direct file by prosecutors, or presumptive
waiver legislation.").
21. WILLIAM BENNETT & JOHN DILULIO, BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY AND
How TO WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 21-34 (1996) (providing a
racialized interpretation and prediction of massive increases in youth violence
committed by "super-predators" based on demographic trends). Analysts debunked
the demographic predictions at the time, see, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN
YOUTH VIOLENCE (1998), and the predicted crime wave never materialized.
However, the intersection of youth, race, and crime fueled punitive policies. See
Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 20, at 1523 (arguing that
politicians exploited the super-predator myth for political advantage); Perry L.
Moriearty, Framing Justice, Media Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L.
REV. 849, 850-51 (2011) (analyzing the impact of the super-predator narrative in
media and political rhetoric).
22. See AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 3 (contending
that politicians sought electoral advantage by "lowering the minimum age for
criminal court jurisdiction, authorizing automatic transfers from juvenile to adult
courts, and increasing the authority of prosecutors to file charges against children
directly in criminal court rather than proceeding in the juvenile justice system");
JOLANTA JUSZKIEWICZ, YOUTH CRIME/ADULT TIME 1 (2000), available at
http://www.cclp.org/documents/BBY/YouthCrimeAdult Time.pdf;
Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 17, at 124-29.
23. Griffin, supra note 15, at 189-92; see CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra
note 14, at 71 (reporting North Carolina transfer law requiring mandatory
prosecution of youths thirteen years or older charged with Class A felonies for
which they can receive life without parole sentences); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra
note 14, at 112-14 (summarizing minimum ages for transfer by judges and
prosecutors).
24. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 20, at 1519-23
(describing role of race, crack cocaine, and gun violence in providing impetus for
conservative get tough policies); Kellar, supra note 15, at 155-56 (depicting "get
tough" waiver legislative changes of the 1990s); Julie Rowe, Mourning the Untimely
Death of the Juvenile Death Penalty: An Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the
Future of the Juvenile Justice System, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 287, 294 (2006) (detailing
get tough legislative changes in the 1990s).
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judicial waiver statutes, but prosecutors' charging decisions
determine the adult status of most youths without any hearing."
By some estimates, prosecutors rather than judges determined the
adult status of eighty-five percent of youths based on age and
offense.2' As a consequence, juvenile court judges do not assess the
culpability or competence of most juveniles whom states prosecute
as adults."
Once states convict youths in criminal court, judges sentence
them as if they were adults and send them to the same prisons."
25. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 19 (estimating that
of the juveniles tried as adults in 1996, about thirty-six percent had a judicial
transfer hearing compared with only thirteen percent in 2000); SNYDER &
SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 110-14 (summarizing statutory waiver mechanisms
and processes).
In some states, prosecutors employed direct filing to charge about ten
percent of juveniles as adults. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., JUVENILE JUSTICE 16
(1995); Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 20, at 208. Florida
prosecutors transferred as many juveniles to criminal courts as did juvenile court
judges via waiver hearings in the entire country, See Vincent Schiraldi & Jason
Ziedenberg, The Florida Experiment: Transferring Power From Judges to
Prosecutors, 15 CRIM. JUST. 46, 47 (2000) ("In 1995 alone ... Florida prosecutors
sent 7,000 cases to adult court, nearly matching the number of cases judges sent to
the criminal justice system nationwide that year."); Charles E. Frazier et al.,
Juveniles in Criminal Court: Past and Current Research in Florida, 18 QLR 573,
579 (1999) (noting that after Florida's adopting direct file laws, "[t]ransfers
increased from roughly 1.3% of the total juvenile filings per year prior to 1979 to a
high of 9.6% in 1993").
26. JUSZKIEWICZ, supra note 22, at 5 ("First, 85% of determinations of whether
tocharge [sic] a juvenile as an adult were not made by judges, but by prosecutors or
by legislatures through statutory exclusions from juvenile court."). Id. at 31 (in
forty-five percent of cases, prosecutors simply filed charges against youths in
criminal court-a rate three times that of judicial waiver; in another forty percent
of cases, prosecutors charged youths with statutorily excluded offenses).
27. See, e.g., PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME, at xii (1996) (describing the
trend in the early 1990s for more states to exclude serious offenses from juvenile
court jurisdiction); Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation and Execution:
Transferring Children to Criminal Court in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 447,
487-94 (questioning the adequacy of waiver procedures to conduct individualized
culpability assessments); Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 17, at 85-86,
(describing legislative trends and providing a statutory table of offenses excluded
from juvenile court jurisdiction). Moreover, waiver statutes typically focus on
"amenability to treatment" or "public safety" rather than maturity or culpability.
See Feld, Violent Youth, supra note 20, at 1029-34 (analyzing changes in statutory
waiver criteria from "amenability to treatment" to "public safety").
28. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS
AND JAILS, at x (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bjal
182503.pdf (reporting that about 14,500 juveniles are confined in adult facilities);
Hillary J. Massey, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life
Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2006) ("[Once children are
prosecuted as adults, they become subject to the same penalties as adults,
including life without the possibility of parole."); Victor Streib & Bernadette
Schrempp, Life Without Parole for Children, 21 CRIM. JUST. 4, 7 (2007) ("[Apart
268 [Vol. 31:263
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Moreover, the same get-tough politics that affected juvenile
policies influenced criminal sentences as well. States extended
sentence lengths, adopted mandatory minimum sentences, and
imposed mandatory life without parole for homicide and other
offenses.29  In the 1980s and 1990s, get-tough justice policies
extended no formal recognition of youthfulness as a mitigating
factor at sentencing."o Some deny young juveniles tried as adults
the protection of the common law infancy defense and judges have
imposed mandatory LWOP sentences on children twelve or
thirteen years of age." Until 2005, some states executed youths
for crimes committed at sixteen or seventeen years of age32 and
until Miller/Jackson most imposed mandatory LWOPs on
juveniles.33
Studies have reported racial disparities in waiver decisions
for decades,34 and get-tough laws have exacerbated racial
differences." Racial stereotypes taint culpability assessments,
from the death penalty), essentially every other criminal sentence is available.
Indeed, one of the political arguments to abolish the death penalty for juveniles
was that they would remain eligible for LWOP, a sufficiently harsh punishment
even without the death penalty."); Rowe, supra note 24, at 294 ("Once a juvenile
offender is in adult court, sentences may be more severe, and the worst offenders
may be sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole.").
29. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996); MICHAEL TONRY,
THINKING ABOUT CRIME (2010).
30. See Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 17, at 129; AMNESTY INT'L &
HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 20.
31. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 13 ("Youth tried as adults
face the same punishments as adults. They can be placed in adult jails pre- and
post-trial, sentenced to serve time in adult prisons, or be placed on adult probation
with few to no rehabilitative services. Youth also are subject to the same sentencing
guidelines as adults and may receive mandatory minimum sentences or life without
parole."); MARC MAUER ET AL., THE MEANING OF "LIFE": LONG PRISON SENTENCES
IN CONTEXT 17 (2004) ("A life sentence mandated for any adult defendant who
committed a particular crime applied in full force to juveniles convicted in adult
court for that crime."); Feld, Responses to Youth Violence, supra note 20, at 212-20
(summarizing state correctional responses to juveniles sentenced as adults).
32. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
33. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
34. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L & HuM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 15-16
(explaining that, since 1984, Black juveniles have comprised the majority of
juveniles admitted to prison); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 25, at 59
(examining the impact of race on judicial waiver decisions); M. A. Bortner et al.,
Race and Transfer: Empirical Research and Social Context, in THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 277 (analyzing racial disparity in
juvenile transfer proceedings); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the
Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME
& DELINQ. 259, 276 (1987) ("[Ilt appears that the effects of race are indirect, but
visible nonetheless.").
35. POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 14, at 4; see also CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH
270 Law and Inequality [Vol. 31:263
reduce the mitigating value of youthfulness for children of color,
and contribute to disproportionate numbers of minority youths
tried and sentenced as adults.36 Successive screenings, differential
processing, and cumulative disadvantage compound until minority
youths comprise the majority of juveniles tried in criminal court
and three-quarters of those who enter prison." Despite declining
JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 11 ("In every state profiled in this report for which data
are available, youth of color are disproportionately affected by these [get-tough]
statutes."); JUSZKIEWICZ, supra note 22, at 6 (reporting that in some jurisdictions,
Black juveniles accounted for approximately three out of ten felony arrests, but
eight out of ten felony cases filed in criminal court); MIKE MALES & DAN
MACALLAIR, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE 7-8 (2000) (studying juvenile transfer and
criminal court sentencing practices and reporting that "[c]ompared to [Wlhite
youths, minority youths are 2.8 times as likely to be arrested for a violent crime,
6.2 times as likely to wind up in adult court, and 7 times as likely to be sent to
prison by adult courts"); NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 20, at 216 ("A high
proportion of the juveniles transferred to adult court are minorities. . . . The
preponderance of minorities among transferred juveniles may be explained in part
by the fact that minorities are disproportionately arrested for serious crimes.");
Bortner, supra note 34, at 277 (analyzing sources of racial disparity in juvenile
transfer proceedings).
36. See Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 20, at 1552-58
(illustrating how coded language can evoke racist sentiments without appearing
explicitly racist); Moriearty, supra note 21, at 850-51 (2011) (arguing that media-
driven fear of minority youth exacerbated punitive policies). Juveniles' race
activates negative stereotypes and denies youths of color the mitigation otherwise
accorded to adolescents. See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming
Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 483, 488-95 (2004). Researchers surveyed police and probation officers and
reported that "unconscious biases trigger the belief that [Black offenders] are adult-
like and therefore as blameworthy as adults who commit similar crimes." Id. at
500. Similarly, probation officers made different attributions of the sources of
Black and White youths criminal misconduct. See George S. Bridges & Sara Steen,
Racial Disparities in Official Assessments in Juveniles Offenders: Attributional
Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 Am. SOC. REV. 554, 561 (1998) (detailing
that "officers describe[d] Black and White youths differently, referring to negative
personality traits for Black youths and more to negative environmental influences
for Whites").
37. See, e.g., POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 14, at 34 (reporting that in
2002, minorities made up nearly three-quarters ofjuveniles admitted to adult state
prisons, with Blacks accounting for fifty-eight percent, Hispanics ten percent, and
other youth of color five percent); Bortner, supra note 34, at 277 (analyzing
cumulative consequences of racial disparities in transfer decisions). One study
reported that criminal court judges imprisoned transferred Black youths at a rate
eighteen times greater than that of White and Hispanic youths at seven times the
rate of White youths. MALES & MACALLAIR, supra note 35, at 9. A study of waiver
practices in eighteen urban counties in eleven states reported that minority youths
comprised eighty-two percent of all juveniles tried in criminal courts. JUSZKIEWICZ,
supra note 22, at 18 (reporting that African-American youths constituted more
than half (fifty-seven percent) of youths prosecuted in criminal courts and Latino
youths constituted another quarter (twenty-three percent)); see also POE-YAMAGATA
& JONES, supra note 14, at 25-26 (providing numbers to support the claim that a
disproportionate number of minorities were in adult prison in 1996). Moreover, the
rate for Black youths sentenced to life without parole exceeds that of White youths
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homicide rates for youths of all races since the mid-1990s, judges
imposed LWOP sentences on Black youths more frequently than
they did White youths."
A. Roper v. Simmons and Youths' Diminished
Responsibility
Christopher Simmons was seventeen years of age-older
than Missouri's juvenile court jurisdiction-when he was tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death for murder. Simmons proposed
to two friends that they commit burglary and murder by breaking
and entering, tying up a victim, and throwing her off a bridge.
After one youth backed out, Simmons and the other boy entered
the victim's home, bound her eyes and mouth with duct tape,
drove her minivan to a state park, tied her hands and feet with
electrical wire, and threw her into a river where she drowned."3
Several years after his conviction, Simmons filed a petition for
state post-conviction relief based on Atkins v. Virginia.0 He
argued that the federal Constitution prohibited states from
executing a juvenile who was under eighteen when he committed
his crime." The Missouri Supreme Court agreed, set aside his
in every state that imposed juvenile LWOP sentences. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, FOR
THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR YOUTH OFFENDERS IN THE
UNITED STATES IN 2008 at 6 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/the rest of their lives_execsum-table.pdf.
38. HUM. RTs. WATCH, supra note 37, at 6-7 (reporting Black LWOPs at 1.59
times the rate of White LWOPs).
39. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556-57 (2005).
40. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring states from executing defendants with
mental retardation). Atkins found a national consensus existed because thirty-one
states barred the practice and few states actually executed offenders with mental
retardation. Id. at 313-16 (counting state statutes and emphasizing that "[iut is not
so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the
direction of change" that enabled the Court to find the existence of a national
consensus). The Atkins Justices' independent proportionality analysis concluded
that mentally impaired defendants lacked the culpability to warrant execution. Id.
at 315-16. Commentators noted the constitutional implications of Atkins'
proportionality analyses for executing juvenile offenders. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan,
Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales for a Categorical
Exemption for Juveniles From Capital Punishment, 33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 207 (2003)
("The Atkins decision, though welcomed by both popular and legal policy audiences,
naturally raises the question: what about juveniles?"); Barry C. Feld, Competence,
Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing
Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 463-64 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Competence,
Culpability, and Punishment] ("[Tihe same psychological and developmental
characteristics that render mentally retarded offenders less blameworthy than
competent adult offenders also characterize the immaturity of judgment and
reduced culpability of adolescents and should likewise prohibit their execution.").
41. Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
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death sentence, and resentenced him to life without parole."
Prior to Roper v. Simmons, the United States Supreme Court
thrice addressed whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited
states from executing juvenile offenders.43 In Eddings v.
Oklahoma," the Court reversed a sixteen-year-old youth's death
sentence because the trial court failed to consider youthfulness as
a mitigating factor. In Thompson v. Oklahoma," a plurality of
justices concluded that fifteen-year-old offenders lacked sufficient
culpability to warrant execution. In 1989, Stanford v. Kentucky
upheld the death penalty for sixteen or seventeen-year-old youths
convicted of murder.' Stanford acknowledged that most juveniles
were less criminally responsible than adults, but rejected a
categorical ban and allowed juries to decide whether a youth's
culpability warranted execution."
Roper v. Simmons overruled Stanford and prohibited states
from executing youths for crimes committed prior to eighteen
42. Id. at 559-60.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). Earlier
decisions adverted to the importance of considering youthfulness as a mitigating
factor in capital sentencing. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-17
(1982) (remanding sixteen-year-old defendant for resentencing after trial court's
failure to properly consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor and noting that
"youth is more than a chronological fact" and "minors, especially in their earlier
years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 608-09 (1978) (requiring sentencing jury to consider all relevant
mitigating factors including age of defendant); Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633,
637 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that a statute allowing for no consideration of
particularized mitigating factors violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
44. 455 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1982). The Court found that the trial judge did,
however, consider age as a mitigating factor. Id. at 115.
45. 487 U.S. 815, 822-23 (1988) (plurality opinion). The Thompson plurality's
proportionality analysis considered both objective factors-e.g., state statutes, jury
practices, and the views of national and international organizations-and the
Justices' own subjective sense of "civilized standards of decency." Id. at 822-31.
The Thompson Court emphasized that deserved punishment must reflect
individual culpability and concluded that "[t]here is also broad agreement on the
proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than
adults." Id. at 834. The Court asserted:
[Liess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to
a comparable crime committed by an adult.... Inexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate
the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is
much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is
an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges
and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.
Id. at 835.
46. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
47. Id. at 375.
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years of age.' State laws and jury sentencing decisions provided
evidence of a national consensus against executing juveniles.49
The Roper Justices also conducted an independent proportionality
analysis and offered three reasons why states could not punish
juveniles as severely as adults."o First, juveniles' immature
judgment and limited self-control cause them to act impulsively
and without full appreciation of consequences." Second, juveniles'
susceptibility to negative peer influences,52 dependence on parents,
and inability to escape criminogenic environments reduced
responsibility for their crimes.' Third, their personalities are
more transitory and less well-formed than adults', and their
crimes provide less reliable evidence of depraved character.54
These developmental features correspond with other criminal law
doctrines that mitigate punishment-e.g., diminished capacity,
duress or provocation, or lack of bad character." Immature
judgment and susceptibility to social influences also negate
48. Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
49. Id. at 564-66 (noting that legislative trends prohibiting executing children
corresponded with those in Atkins in which the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment barred execution of defendants with mental retardation); see also Feld,
Competence, Culpability, and Punishment, supra note 40, at 489-98 (analogizing
between state laws and jury practices in executing defendants with mental
retardation and juveniles). Even after Stanford, no states lowered the age of death
eligibility and five states raised it. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565. In the decade prior to
Roper, only three states executed offenders for crimes committed as juveniles. Id.
at 564-65. National and international legal, professional, and religious
organizations opposed executing juveniles. Id. at 575-78.
50. Id. at 569-72.
51. Id. at 569 ("[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions.") (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)).
52. Id. at 569 ("[Jjuveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.").
53. Id. (noting that juveniles are more susceptible to negative influences
because they "have less control, or less experience with control, over their own
environment"). The Court explained that "tlheir own vulnerability and
comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have
a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences
in their whole environment." Id. at 570.
54. Id. at 570 ("[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult."). Because juveniles' character is transitional, "[fJrom a moral standpoint it
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
great possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed." Id.
55. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and
Age Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 73 (2005); Laurence Steinberg &
Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1016 (2003).
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retributive and deterrent justifications for the death penalty."
Roper spared seventy youths on death row, and states converted
their sentences to life without the possibility of parole.
Justice O'Connor's dissent acknowledged that juveniles
generally are less culpable than adults, but questioned whether
the differences between a seventeen-year-old juvenile and an
eighteen-year-old adult justified a bright-line rule." She believed
that some seventeen-year-old murderers were sufficiently culpable
to deserve execution" and argued that juries could weigh
56. Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-72. Roper noted the two penal functions served by
the death penalty-retribution and deterrence-and concluded that:
Whether viewed as an attempt to express the community's moral outrage
or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case
for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. Retribution
is not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one
whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.
Id. at 571. Similarly, the Court concluded that juveniles' immature judgment
decreased the likelihood that the threat of execution would deter them, arguing
that "the absence of evidence of deterrent effect is of special concern because
the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults
suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence." Id.
57. See Elizabeth Cepparulo, Roper v. Simmons: Unveiling Juvenile Purgatory:
Is Life Really Better than Death?, 16 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 225, 225 (2006)
(noting that the impact of Roper was to convert capital sentences to sentences of life
without the possibility of parole because "in many states, life without parole and
death are the only two options when sentencing homicide offenders"); see also Davis
v. Jones, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (finding that defendant was
seventeen years old at the time of his conviction and capital sentence, and, as a
result of Roper, "the sentence of death is no longer constitutionally valid, [so] the
only sentencing alternative is life without parole"); Duncan v. State, 925 So. 2d 245,
281 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that, because of Roper, this case was remanded
with instructions to "set aside the appellant's death sentence and resentence him to
imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole"); Duke v. State, 922 So. 2d
179, 181 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that, following Roper, the case of a
sixteen-year-old convicted of capital crime must be remanded "to set aside Duke's
sentence of death and to resentence him to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole-the only other sentence available for a defendant convicted of
capital murder"); Lecroy v. State, 954 So. 2d 747, 748 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)
(affirming the trial court's decision to conform the defendant's sentence to the state
supreme court's specifications: life without the possibility of parole for twenty-five
years); State v. Craig, 944 So. 2d 660, 662 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting seventeen-
year-old capital defendant's claim that post-Roper resentencing to life
imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole violated state constitutional
prohibition of excessive punishment).
58. Roper, 543 U.S. at 590-92, 601 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
her votes in Thompson and Stanford and reaffirming her adherence to the latter
rationale).
59. Id. at 588. Justice O'Connor elaborated:
[Tihe Court adduces no evidence whatsoever in support of its sweeping
conclusion that it is only in 'rare' cases, if ever, that seventeen-year-old
murderers are sufficiently mature and act with sufficient depravity to
warrant the death penalty. The fact that juveniles are generally less
culpable for their misconduct than adults does not necessarily mean that a
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2013] ADOLESCENT CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 275
youthfulness as a mitigating factor." Justice Scalia's dissent
derided the social science research on which the majority relied to
find that all juveniles lacked culpability to warrant execution" and
argued for individualized assessments rather than a categorical
prohibition.62
Although the Roper majority and dissents differed on several
issues,6 their fundamental disagreement concerned whether to
17-year-old murderer cannot be sufficiently culpable to merit the death
penalty.... But an especially depraved juvenile offender may nevertheless
be just as culpable as many adult offenders considered bad enough to
deserve the death penalty.
Id. at 599-600.
60. Id. at 602-03. Justice O'Connor objected that the Court's rejection of
individualized culpability assessments was contrary to its death penalty
jurisprudence that rejected arbitrary, categorical rules in favor of "individualized
sentencing in which juries are required to give appropriate mitigating weight to the
defendant's immaturity, his susceptibility to outside pressures, his cognizance of
the consequences of his actions, and so forth." Id. at 602-03.
61. Id. at 617-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Roper, 543 U.S. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He chided the majority for
providing no evidence that "juries cannot be trusted with the delicate task of
weighing a defendant's youth" and objected that such a view "undermines the very
foundations of our capital sentencing system, which entrusts juries with 'mak[ing]
the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification.'" Id. (quoting
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987)); see also Wayne Myers, Roper v.
Simmons: The Collision of National Consensus and Proportionality Review, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 947, 991 (2006) ("[Tlhe central defect in the majority's ...
analysis [is] its complete failure to support the contention that a jury cannot
adequately account for youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing decisions.").
63. The majority and dissents disagreed about the proper denominator to use to
calculate the existence of a national consensus against executing juveniles-all
states or only those with death penalty laws. Roper, 543 U.S. at 595-96 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (contrasting state laws rejecting execution of defendants with mental
retardation in Atkins with laws regarding executing juveniles); id. at 609-11
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that relevant reference groups are policies of states
that employ the death penalty for some offenders).
They also differed over the role of international law in interpreting domestic
constitutional provisions. Compare id. at 575-78 (majority opinion) (noting that
"the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official
sanction to the juvenile death penalty" and referring to "the laws of other countries
and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment"), with id. at 604-05 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging limited
role of international law because the "Nation's evolving understanding of human
dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the
values prevailing in other countries"), and id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority's premise that American law should reflect views of the
rest of the world "ought to be rejected out of hand").
Finally, the dissenters criticized the majority for failing to condemn the
Missouri Supreme Court for anticipatorily overruling Stanford. Id. at 593-94
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Court's failure to reprove Missouri Supreme
Court for failing to follow Stanford); id. at 628-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("To add
insult to injury, the Court affirms the Missouri Supreme Court without even
admonishing that court for its flagrant disregard of our precedent in Stanford.").
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impose a categorical bar on the death penalty or to allow juries to
evaluate youths' culpability individually.' Justice Kennedy opted
for a categorical ban:
The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person
to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability. An
unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-
blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower
mitigating arguments based on youth as a matter of course,
even where the juvenile offender's objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a
sentence less severe than death .
Clinicians do not diagnose people younger than eighteen with
antisocial personality disorder,66 and Roper declined to let jurors
make such culpability assessments. A brutal murder could
overwhelm the mitigating role of youthfulness," and Roper used
age as a conclusive proxy for reduced culpability to prevent jurors
from treating it as an aggravating factor."
64. Compare id. at 572-73 (majority opinion) ("The differences between juvenile
and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful
person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient culpability."), with id. at
602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhese [Eighth Amendment] concerns may
properly be addressed not by means of an arbitrary, categorical age-based rule, but
rather through individualized sentencing in which juries are required to give
appropriate mitigating weight to the defendant's immaturity, his susceptibility to
outside pressures, his cognizance of the consequences of his actions, and so forth."),
and id. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[The majority's] startling conclusion
undermines the very foundations of our capital sentencing system, which entrusts
juries with mak[ing] the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy
codification and that buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system."
(quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
65. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-73 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 573 (noting that psychologists cannot differentiate between an
immature juvenile's crime and the "rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption").
67. Emens, supra note 55, at 83 ("[T]o the extent we see or want to see
childhood as a time of innocence, cognitive dissonance may prompt us to reconceive
a child who does terrible things as an adult.").
68. Id. at 52-53 (noting that the prosecutor in Roper improperly argued the
defendant's age was an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor); Norman J.
Finkel, Prestidigitation, Statistical Magic, and Supreme Court Numerology in
Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 612, 636 (1995)
(reporting social science studies showing that "[wihen heinousness increases, it
exerts a more powerful effect than age"); Rowe, supra note 24, at 311 ("By taking
these sentencing decisions out of a jury's hands, the Court implicitly doubted
American citizens' ability to weigh a body of evidence and recommend an
appropriate sentence for a sixteen-year-old or seventeen-year-old defendant who
kills in cold blood.").
The vehemence with which some post-Roper commentators used egregious
juvenile crimes to criticize the decision bolsters the accuracy of Justice Kennedy's
intuition. See, e.g., Mitchel Brim, A Sneak Preview Into How the Court Took Away
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B. Developmental Psychology and Adolescent Culpability
Roper gave three reasons why adolescents are less culpable
than adults: immature judgment, susceptibility to negative peer
influences, and transitional identities. But the Court relied more
on intuition-"as any parent knows"6 -than on scientific
evidence." Several amicus briefs presented developmental
psychological and neuroscientific research about youths'
diminished culpability, but the Court did not analyze or identify
the decisive evidence." Immature judgment, impulsivity, and
limited self-control bear directly on evaluations of criminal
responsibility, and developmental and neuroscientific research
inform those assessments.7 2
a State's Right to Execute Sixteen and Seventeen Year Old Juveniles: The Threat of
Execution Will No Longer Save an Innocent Victim's Life, 82 DENv. U. L. REV. 739,
753 (2005) (beginning with a recitation of a horrific crime committed by juveniles
and concluding that "[ilt is a grave injustice, not only to the victim and the victim's
family, but also to society as a whole because the Court is able to disrespect the
victim and the victim's family by not basing its decision on the respondent's moral
culpability but rather on the Justices' individual perceptions and biases"); Moin A.
Yahya, Deterring Roper's Juveniles Using a Law and Economics Approach to Show
that the Logic of Roper Implies that Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More Than
Adults, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 53, 106 (2006) ("If Roper is correct in assuming that
juveniles are reckless, voracious consumers of the present, who have little fear of
punishment because of their underdeveloped brains, then harsher punishments are
needed to control them."); Benyomin Forer, Juveniles and the Death Penalty: An
Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the Future of Capital Punishment, 35 SW. U.
L. REV. 161, 171-75, 180 (2006) (summarizing facts of egregious cases and
concluding that "the Court's analysis and determinations were deficient" and
"overruled existing case law on flimsy grounds"); Steven J. Wernick, Constitutional
Law: Elimination of the Juvenile Death Penalty-Substituting Moral Judgment for
a True National Consensus, 58 FLA. L. REV. 471, 481-82 (2006).
69. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (observing summarily that juveniles are immature,
impulsive, and irresponsible).
70. Id. at 617-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's selective and
inconsistent use of social science studies as "look[ing] over the heads of the crowd
and pick[ing] out its friends"); Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of
Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 396 (2006) ("[A]lthough Roper was
correct in its result, the Court's use of social science research was, at times, limited
and flawed. Even when the Court attempts to examine research that is widely
accepted and highly regarded, the Court does not always appear to have the tools
necessary to provide a sufficiently firm social science foundation.").
71. Denno, supra note 70, at 381-87 (arguing that while the Court relies on the
"scientific and sociological studies respondent and his amici cite," it fails to identify
which studies or data supported its conclusions about the differences between
adolescents and adults).
72. Elizabeth Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal
Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 229-35 (1995) [hereinafter Scott et al., Legal
Contexts]; Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as
Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report: Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEV.
PSYCHOL. 1764, 1764 (2008); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming
Youth, 81 TEx. L. REV. 799, 816 (2003).
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Retributive sentencing theory proportions punishment to a
crime's seriousness.7 Two elements-harm and culpability-
define how serious a crime is and how much punishment the actor
deserves:7 1
[T]he degree of blameworthiness of an offense is generally
assessed according to two kinds of elements: the nature and
seriousness of the harm caused or threatened by the crime;
and the offender's degree of culpability in committing the
crime, in particular, his or her degree of intent (mens rea),
motives, role in the offense, and mental illness or other
diminished capacity.75
An offender's age does not change the nature of the harm
caused-a fifteen-year-old can inflict the same injuries as an
adult.7 6  However, a youth's inability to fully appreciate
73. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE, PROPORTIONALITY
PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
161 (2009) (arguing that "the offender's blameworthiness for an offense is generally
assessed according to two elements: the nature and seriousness of the harm
foreseeably caused or threatened by the crime and the offender's culpability in
committing the crime [in particular, the offender's degree of intent (mens rea),
motives, role in the offense, and mental illness or other diminished capacity]");
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 48 (1976)
("[Plunishing someone conveys in dramatic fashion that his conduct was wrong and
that he is blameworthy for having committed it."); Richard S. Frase, Excessive
Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality"
Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 589-91 (2005) (summarizing principles of
retributive sentencing theory); see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND
SANCTIONS 15 (1993); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES:
DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 31 (1985).
74. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe proportionality principle takes account not only of the 'injury to
the person and to the public' caused by a crime, but also of the 'moral depravity' of
the offender." (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977))); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 815 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
offender's culpability-"the degree of the defendant's blameworthiness"-is central
to determining the penalty); Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment:
Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 707
(1998) ("[A] sentence must correspond to the crime-not just to the harm caused by
the offense, but also to the culpability of the offender."); Scott & Steinberg, supra
note 72, at 822 ("Only a blameworthy moral agent deserves punishment at all, and
blameworthiness (and the amount of punishment deserved) can vary depending on
the attributes of the actor or the circumstances of the offense."); Franklin E.
Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity,
Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 271 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds.,
2000) ("But desert is a measure of fault that will attach very different punishment
to criminal acts that cause similar amounts of harm.").
75. Frase, supra note 73, at 590 (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 174 (1975) (arguing
that the victim of a crime is just as victimized, regardless of the age of the
perpetrator, and the need for social defense is the same).
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wrongfulness or to control behavior may reduce culpability."
Youths' limited understanding of consequences and truncated
impulse control lessen the blameworthiness of the harms they
cause.7 ' States may hold them accountable for those harms, but
should not punish them as severely as adults."
77. Just deserts theory and criminal law grading principles base the degree of
deserved punishment on the actor's culpability. For example, a person may cause
the death of another individual with premeditation and deliberation, intentionally,
"in the heat of passion," recklessly, negligently, or accidentally. See JEROME HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 105-45 (2d ed. 1960). The criminal law
treats the same objective harm-for example, the death of a person-quite
differently depending on the actor's culpability. Id.
Offender culpability is central to ensuring rational and proportional
sentencing. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (reasoning that "[dleeply
ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal
conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought
to be punished"). See also David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence and
Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1555, 1557 (2004) ("[Jluveniles tend to be less competent in discriminating right
from wrong and in being able to regulate successfully their actions in accord with
these discriminations. If they are less competent, then they are less responsible.").
78. See AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTs. WATCH, supra note 16, at 113 (explaining
that penal proportionality requires consideration of both the nature of the offense
and the culpability of the offender). The report also noted:
Children can commit the same acts as adults, but by virtue of their
immaturity, they cannot be as blameworthy or as culpable. They do not
have adults' developed abilities to think, to weigh consequences, to make
sound decisions, to control their impulses, and to resist group pressures;
their brains are anatomically different, still evolving into the brains of
adults.
Id.; see also, Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency: The Relevance of
Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, 7 SOc. PHIL. & POL'Y 59, 67-68
(1990) (arguing that the criminal law treats children differently than adults
because they are not "full moral agents, despite their capacity for practical reason
and their freedom to act on the basis of their reasoned choices"); Elizabeth S. Scott
& Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on
Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 176 (1997)
("[Adolescents'] criminal choices are presumed less to express individual
preferences and more to reflect the behavioral influences characteristic of a
transitory developmental stage that are generally shared with others in the age
cohort. This difference supports drawing a line based on age, and subjecting
adolescents to a categorical presumption of reduced responsibility."); Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A Developmental
Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 389,
407-09 (1999) (explaining that youths lack "ability to control [their] impulses, to
manage [their] behavior in the face of pressure from others to violate the law, or to
extricate [themselves] from a potentially problematic situation," and that these
deficiencies render them less blameworthy).
79. Zimring uses the term "diminished responsibility" to refer to adolescents
who possess "the minimum abilities for blameworthiness and thus for
punishment... [whose] immaturity ... still suggests that less punishment is
justified . . . ." Zimring, supra note 74, at 273; see also FRANKLIN ZIMRING,
AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 75 (1998) (contending that "even after a youth passes
the minimum threshold of competence, this barely competent youth is not as
culpable and therefore not as deserving of a full measure of punishment as a fully
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Developmental psychologists study how children's thinking
and behavior change as they mature."o By mid-adolescence, most
youths can distinguish right from wrong and reason similarly to
adults." For example, adolescents and adults make informed
consent decisions in medical settings similarly.8 2 However, the
qualified adult offender"); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 830 (reporting that
compared with adults, youths act more impulsively, weigh consequences differently
from adults, and discount risks because of normal developmental processes that
'undermine [their] decisionmaking capacity in ways that are accepted as mitigating
culpability").
80. See, e.g., Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 78, at 391:
Developmental psychology, broadly defined, concerns the scientific study of
changes in physical, intellectual, emotional, and social development over
the life cycle. Developmental psychologists are mainly interested in the
study of 'normative' development (i.e., patterns of behavior, cognition, and
emotion that are regular and predictable within the vast majority of the
population of individuals of a given chronological age), but they are also
interested in understanding normal individual differences in development
(i.e., common variations within the range of what is considered normative
for a given chronological age) as well as the causes and consequences of
atypical or pathological development (i.e., development that departs
significantly from accepted norms).
Id.
81. See, e.g., Cynthia V. Ward, Punishing Children in the Criminal Law, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 434-36 (2006) (arguing that the cognitive competence of
adolescents enables them to form the mens rea to commit a crime and essentially
refutes claims that the criminal law should treat them differently than adults);
Gary B. Melton, Toward "Personhood" for Adolescents: Autonomy and Privacy as
Values in Public Policy, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 99, 100 (1983). Developmental
psychological research on adolescents' cognitive decision-making ability suggests
that "for most purposes, adolescents cannot be distinguished from adults on the
ground of competence in decision making alone." Id. But see Elizabeth Cauffman
et al., Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents' Competence and
Culpability, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 403, 406-07 (1999) (condemning cognitive
studies as methodologically limited and failing to assess real-life decision-making);
Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37
VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (1992) (criticizing researchers who find no differences
between adolescents' and adults' decision-making for focusing too narrowly on
cognitive as opposed to judgmental factors).
82. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617-21 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court cited research on adolescents' competence to make
informed consent decisions in the context of abortion); Stephen J. Morse,
Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 52-53 (1998)
(concluding that cognitive capacity and formal reasoning ability of mid-adolescents
does not differ significantly from that of adults). Research on young peoples'
abilities to make informed medical decisions tends to support equating adolescents'
and adults' cognitive abilities. See Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors'
Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective, 9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 423
(1978) (finding that little research evidence exists to support that adolescents aged
fifteen or older possess less competence than adults to provide knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary informed consent); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The
Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53
CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982) (noting that fourteen-year-olds' choices did not differ
significantly from those of adults in terms of "evidence of choice, reasonable[ness of]
outcome, rational[ity of] reason[ing], and understanding" when responding to
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ability to make reasonable decisions after reflection under
laboratory conditions is significantly different from the ability to
make responsible choices spontaneously in stressful
circumstances.' Emotions influence youths' judgment to a greater
extent than adults, and researchers distinguish between decisions
made under conditions of "cold" and "hot" cognition.' Excitement
and stress cause youths to make riskier decisions than adults do."
medical and psychological treatment hypotheticals).
83. See Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective
Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1770 (1995)
[hereinafter Cauffman & Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Influences]; Scott &
Steinberg, supra note 72, at 812-13 ("These findings from laboratory studies are
only modestly useful, however, in understanding how youths compare to adults in
making choices that have salience to their lives or that are presented in stressful
unstructured settings (such as the street) in which decisionmakers must rely on
personal experience and knowledge."); L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-
Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS
417, 423 (2000) ("[T]he decision making capacity of adolescents may be more
vulnerable to disruption by the stresses and strains of everyday living than that of
adults. That is, unlike adults, adolescents may exhibit considerably poorer
cognitive performance under circumstances involving everyday stress and time-
limited situations than under optimal test conditions."); Laurence Steinberg &
Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in
Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 250 (1996) [hereinafter
Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment] ("[Tihe informed consent model is
too narrow in scope ... because it overemphasizes cognitive functioning (e.g.,
capacity for thinking, reasoning, understanding) and minimizes the importance of
noncognitive, psychosocial variables that influence the decision-making process
(i.e., aspects of development and behavior that involve personality traits,
interpersonal relations, and affective experience).").
84. See, e.g., Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 115, 119 (2007):
[Aldolescents are much less capable of making sound decisions when under
stressful conditions or when peer pressure is strong. Psychosocial
researchers have referred to cognition in these different contexts as cold
versus hot. The traits that are commonly associated with being an
adolescent-short-sightedness (i.e., inability to make decisions based on
long-term planning), impulsivity, hormonal changes, and susceptibility to
peer influence-can quickly undermine one's ability to make sound
decisions in periods of hot cognition.
Id. See also Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and
Behavioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 61 (2001)
(detailing that "[clold cognition refers to thinking under conditions of low emotion
and/or arousal, whereas hot cognition refers to thinking under conditions of strong
feelings or high arousal. The cognitive processes involved in hot cognition may, in
fact, be much more important for understanding why people make risky choices in
real-life situations" especially amongst youths).
85. See, e.g., Bernd Figner et al., Affective and Deliberative Processes in Risky
Choice, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 709, 726-28 (2009) (reporting that
adolescents are more heavily influenced by the emotional limbic system and make
riskier decisions under stressful conditions); Scott, supra note 81, at 1645 (arguing
that youthfulness impairs consideration of alternatives or weighing and comparing
consequences); Dahl, supra note 84, at 62 ("[D]ecision-making sequences regarding
risky behavior in adolescence cannot be fully understood without considering the
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Beginning in the mid-1990s, the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation sponsored the Adolescent Development
and Juvenile Justice (ADJJ) Research Network to study juvenile
decision-making, judgment, and adjudicative competence. Over
the next decade, the ADJJ Research Network produced a
substantial body of research on adolescent development and its
implications for juvenile and criminal justice policies."
The ADJJ research distinguishes between youths' cognitive
abilities and maturity of judgment." Although sixteen-year-olds
exhibit cognitive abilities comparable with adults," their ability to
make adult-quality decisions or exercise self-control does not
emerge for several more years.8 9 The ADJJ describes the
"Immaturity Gap" as the disconnect between cognitive ability and
role of emotions . . . ."); Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note
83, at 259 ("[Slensation seeking increases during adolescence, leading to increased
risk taking as a means of achieving excitement.").
86. See MAcARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEv. & JUV. JUST.,
http://www.adjj.org/downloads/552network-overview.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2013);
see, e.g., PETER W. GREENWOOD, DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS CRIME-CONTROL
POLICY (2006); THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL DISORDERS (2004)); OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN (Darnell F. Hawkins
& Kimberly Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005); THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000); Richard J. Bonnie &
Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 73 (Thomas Grisso &
Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (analyzing adjudicative competencies of adolescents
and their implications for justice administration); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN
AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING
(2004); ELIZABETH ScoTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
(2008).
87. Development and Criminal Blameworthiness, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES.
NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUV. JUST. (Oct. 4, 2006, 10:40 AM),
http://www.adjj.org/downloads (follow "303OPPT- Adolescent . . >" hyperlink)
[hereinafter MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK] (reporting a disjunction between
youths' cognitive ability and their maturity of judgment). "By age sixteen,
individuals show adult levels of performance on tasks of basic information
processing and logical reasoning. Yet in the real world, adolescents show poorer
judgment than adults." Id.
88. See id. (graph entitled "Basic Intellectual Abilities Are Mature by Age 16").
89. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 813 ("Psycho-social development
proceeds more slowly than cognitive development. As a consequence, even when
adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful decision-
making may still differ due to immature judgment."); Scott et al., Legal Contexts,
supra note 72, at 224; Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of
Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 152 (2003) ("[F]or all the importance of
cognitive development, aspects of behavior that involve interpersonal and affective
experience may offer even more information about an adolescent's decision-making
processes."). Contra Ward, supra note 81, at 446-56 (arguing that even very young
children possess sufficient rationality to act instrumentally, and therefore no
reasons exist to punish them differently than adults).
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mature judgment.90  Youths' immature judgment reflects
differences in risk perception, appreciation of future consequences,
capacity for self-control, and experience with autonomy.9' The
general discrepancy between youth and adults in knowledge and
experience, time perspective, risk proclivity, and impulsivity
renders their bad choices less blameworthy.92
90. MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK, supra note 87 (graph entitled "The
Immaturity Gap"); see, e.g., Cauffman & Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective
Influences, supra note 83, at 1765; Scott et al., Legal Contexts, supra note 72, at
227; Scott & Grisso, supra note 78, at 157. Psycho-social factors affecting
adolescents' decisions to engage in crime include "peer influence, temporal
perspective (a tendency to focus on short-term versus long-term consequences), and
risk perception and preference... . We designate these psychosocial influences as
'judgment' factors, and argue that immature judgment in adolescence may
contribute to choices about involvement in crime." Id.; see also Steinberg &
Cauffman, supra note 78, 407-08 (explaining that the quality of adolescent
decision-making subsumes three categories of psycho-social factors: "responsibility
(the capacity to make a decision in an independent, self-reliant fashion),
perspective (the capacity to place a decision within a broader temporal and
interpersonal context), and temperance (the capacity to exercise self-restraint and
control one's impulses)").
91. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 82, at 53 (describing characteristics of youths
that distinguish their decision-making capabilities from those of adults); Scott &
Steinberg, supra note 72, at 813 ("[Elven when adolescent cognitive capacities
approximate those of adults, youthful decisionmaking may still differ due to
immature judgment. The psycho-social factors most relevant to differences in
judgment include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk,(c) temporal perspective, and (d) capacity for self-management.. .. [I]mmature
judgment can affect outcomes because these developmental factors influence
adolescent values and preferences that drive the cost-benefit calculus in the
making of choices."); Scott et al., Legal Contexts, supra note 72, at 229-35
(depicting psycho-social and developmental factors that contribute to juveniles'
immature judgment); Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment, supra note 83,
at 252 (emphasizing temperance, perspective, and judgment as ways in which
adolescents' thinking diverges from adults); Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence
Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 15, 20 (2008) (noting that "considerable evidence supports
the conclusion that children and adolescents are less capable decision makers than
adults in ways that are relevant to their criminal choices").
92. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 91, at 20 (suggesting that because youths
assess and weigh risks differently than adults, they are less likely to anticipate
that someone might get hurt or killed in the commission of a felony); Scott &
Grisso, supra note 78, at 160-61 (noting that psycho-social developmental factors
affecting judgment and criminal responsibility in adolescents include: "(1)
conformity and compliance in relation to peers, (2) attitude toward and perception
of risk, and (3) temporal perspective"); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 813;
Scott et al., Legal Contexts, supra note 72, at 227 (proposing "judgment" framework
to evaluate quality of adolescent decision-making that includes not only cognitive
capacity, but also influence of factors such as "conformity and compliance in




1. Immature Judgment and Impulse Control
Adolescents' propensity to engage in risky behavior" is
reflected in higher rates of accidents, suicide, drug use, unsafe sex,
and criminal activity." To assess risks, a person has to be able to
identify potential outcomes, estimate their likelihood of occurring,
and make valuations of possible consequences." Adolescents
underestimate the amount and likelihood of risks, emphasize
immediate outcomes, and focus on gains rather than losses to a
greater extent than do adults.9 6 Younger teens are more impulsive
93. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 814 ("Future orientation, the
capacity and inclination to project events into the future, may also influence
judgment, since it will affect the extent to which individuals consider the long-term
consequences of their actions in making choices. Over an extended period between
childhood and young adulthood, individuals become more future-oriented."); Spear,
supra note 83, at 421 (noting that "lr]elative to individuals at other ages, . . .
adolescents . . . exhibit a disproportionate amount of reckless behavior, sensation
seeking and risk taking.").
94. See William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking,
in ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 66, 67 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993);
Marrus & Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 1162-63 (describing various ways in which
juveniles engage in risky behavior-for example, unprotected sex, drugs, drinking,
driving recklessly). Teenagers' greater proclivity to engage in unprotected sex and
to speed and drive recklessly reflects various forms of risk-taking with respect to
health and safety. See John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding
Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 38-48 (2001) (summarizing
criminological research reporting peak of criminal involvement in mid-to-late
adolescence with sharp desistance thereafter and attributing youthful involvement
to normal developmental transition to adulthood); Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal
Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH
ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 291 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter Scott, Lessons]:
Many adolescents become involved in criminal activity in their teens and
desist by the time they reach young adulthood. . . . [CIriminologists ...
conclude that participation in delinquency is 'a normal part of teen life.'
For most adolescent delinquents, desistance from antisocial behavior also
seems to be a predictable part of the maturation process.
Id. at 300; see also Spear, supra note 83, at 421 ("[W]ith half or more of adolescents
exhibiting drunk driving, sex without contraception, use of illegal drugs, and minor
criminal activities, 'reckless behavior becomes virtually a normative characteristic
of adolescent development.'" (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
Adolescence, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 344 (1992))).
95. See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A
Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 3-4 (1992); see also
Thomas Grisso, Society's Retributive Response to Juvenile Violence: A
Developmental Perspective, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 229, 241 (1996) ("We need to
examine the extent to which midadolescents typically might not yet have achieved
adultlike ways of framing problems .. . and generating alternative responses to
stressful situations or weighing the potential consequences of their alternatives.").
96. See Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 95, at 19 ("[Aldolescents [may] judge
some negative consequences in the distant future to be of lower probability than do
adults or to be of less importance than adults do."); Thomas Grisso, What We Know
About Youths' Capacities as Trial Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 139 (Thomas Grisso & Robert
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than their older peers or adults." Adolescents may possess less
information" or consider fewer options than adults which affects
their risk calculus." Youths and adults use the same amount of
time to solve simple problems, but adults take more time to solve
complex problems.'o
Youths' perception of risk declines during mid-adolescence
and then gradually increases into adulthood. Sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds anticipate fewer risks than do younger or
older research subjects."o' They are more present-oriented and
discount future consequences.102 They weigh costs and benefits
differently than adults and apply different subjective values to
outcomes.' Adolescents prefer an immediate, albeit smaller,
G. Schwartz eds., 2000) ("[A]dolescents ... may differ from adults in the weights
that they give to potential positive and negative outcomes .. . [and] are more likely
than adults to give greater weight to anticipated gains than to possible losses or
negative risks."); Scott, Lessons, supra note 94, at 306 ("[A]dolescents ... could
differ from adults in the subjective value that is assigned to perceived
consequences ... [and] may weigh costs and benefits differently, sometimes even
viewing as a benefit what adults would consider to be a cost.").
97. MAcARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK, supra note 87 (graph entitled
"Impulsivity Declines with Age").
98. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) ("Inexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the
consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more
apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult."); Scott,
Lessons, supra note 94, at 304-05 ("Adolescents, perhaps because they have less
knowledge and experience, are less aware of risks than are adults.... [T]he fact
that adolescents have less experience and knowledge than adults seems likely to
affect their decision making in tangible and intangible ways." (citation omitted));
Taylor-Thompson, supra note 89, at 153 ("Adolescents assess risk differently than
adults. This may result from adolescents being unaware of risks that adults
typically perceive, having incorrect information about risks, or calculating the
probability or magnitude of the risk in ways that adults would not." (footnotes
omitted)).
99. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 89, at 153 ("In situations where adults
will likely perceive and weigh multiple alternatives as part of rational decision-
making, adolescents typically see only one option. This inflexible 'either-or-
mentality' becomes especially acute under stressful conditions.").
100. MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK, supra note 87 (graph entitled "With
Age, Longer Time Spent Thinking Before Acting").
101. Id. (graph entitled "Risk Perception Declines and Then Increases After Mid-
Adolescence").
102. Id. (graph entitled "Future Orientation Increases With Age").
103. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent
Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607, 1608, 1645-47 (1992) (discussing how
youths' perceptions of and preferences for risk differ from those of adults). Young
people may discount negative future consequences because they have more
difficulty than adults integrating it because of their more limited experience. See
William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents' AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational
Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 17, 17-19 (William
Gardner et al. eds., 1990); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 89, at 154 ("Adolescents,
more than adults, tend to discount the future and to afford greater weight to short-
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reward, whereas adults delay gratification unless the present
payout is only slightly discounted."o' Additionally, youths view not
engaging in risky behaviors differently than adults."' They crave
sensation and excitement-the adrenaline rush." Risk-taking
and sensation-seeking peak around sixteen or seventeen and then
decline in adulthood."' The divergence between perception of and
appetite for risk corresponds with increases in youths' criminal
activity. Feelings of invulnerability and immortality heighten
youths' risk propensity."as
2. Neuroscience and Adolescent Brain Development
The human brain does not mature until the early twenties,
and the differences that social scientists observe in youths' and
adults' thinking and behavior reflect these developmental
features." Youths do not have the physiological capacity of adults
term consequences of decisions.").
104. MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK, supra note 87 (graph entitled "Older
Individuals Are More Willing to Delay Gratification").
105. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 815 ("[Aldolescents are less risk-
averse than adults, generally weighing rewards more heavily than risks in making
choices. In part, this may be due to limits on youthful time perspective; taking risks
is more costly for those who focus on the future."); Scott & Grisso, supra note 78, at
163; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 89, at 153 ("[Aldolescents experience greater
concern-and anxiety-over the consequences of refusing to engage in risky
conduct than adults do, thanks to greater fear of being socially ostracized.").
106. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 78, at 163 (contending that adolescents are
more willing than adults to take physical and social risks for the sake of
experiencing novel and complex sensations); Spear, supra note 83, at 422:
Individuals engaging in risk taking may do so to attain the positive
arousal produced by the sensations of novelty, complexity, change or
intensity of experience.. . . Perceived risks of risk taking decline with age
during adolescence, so it is possible that the level of risk taking necessary
to attain an 'adrenaline rush' of danger may rise as well, perhaps leading
to an escalation of risk-taking behaviors in certain individuals,
particularly those with poor prospects for attaining other reinforcers.
Id. (quoting D. Wilson & M. Daly, Lethal Confrontational Violence Among Young
Men, in ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING, supra note 94 , at 84); see also Taylor-
Thompson, supra note 89, at 153 (arguing that sensation-seeking activity increases
for youths between sixteen and nineteen years of age).
107. MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK, supra note 87 (graph entitled
"Preference for Risk Peaks in Mid-Adolescence"); id. (graph entitled "Sensation-
Seeking Declines With Age"); see also Steinberg et al., supra note 72, at 1764.
108. See Lawrence D. Cohn et al., Risk-Perception: Differences Between
Adolescents and Adults, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 217, 221 (1995) (reporting that
adolescents engage in "health-threatening activities" because they "do not regard
[such] behavior as extremely risky or unsafe," rather than because of "unique
feelings of invulnerability"); Furby & Beyth-Marom, supra note 95, at 19-2 1.
109. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 816 (summarizing research on
brain development and its implications for adolescent self-control):
[Riegions of the brain implicated in processes of long-term planning,
regulation of emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and
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to exercise mature judgment or control impulses effectively."' Two
neurobiological systems underlie youths' propensity to engage in
risky behavior. The prefrontal regulatory system is responsible for
judgment and impulse control, and the limbic system is
responsible for emotional and reward-seeking behavior.' The
prefrontal cortex (PFC) of the frontal lobe of the brain operates as
the chief executive officer."' Executive functions include
reward continue to mature over the course of adolescence, and perhaps
well into young adulthood. At puberty, changes in the limbic system-a
part of the brain that is central in the processing and regulation of
emotion-may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty and to
take more risks; these changes also may contribute to increased
emotionality and vulnerability to stress. At the same time, patterns of
development in the prefrontal cortex, which is active during the
performance of complicated tasks involving planning and decision-making,
suggest that these higher-order cognitive capacities may be immature well
into middle adolescence.
Id.; see also Dahl, supra note 84, at 69 ("Regions in the PFC [prefrontal cortex] that
underpin higher cognitive-executive functions mature slowly, showing functional
changes that continue well into late adolescence/adulthood."). For a scientific
analysis on the development of the teenage brain, see Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health,
Teenage Brain, http://www.nimh.nih.govfhealth/publications/
teenage-brain-a-work-in-progress.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). See also
TomdA Paus et al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children and
Adolescents: In Vivo Study, 283 Scl. 1908, 1908 (1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In
Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal
Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859 (1999) [hereinafter Sowell et al., In Vivo
Evidence]; Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray
Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During
Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819 (2001) [hereinafter
Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth] (discussing significant changes in
brain structure prior to adulthood); Spear, supra note 83, at 438 ("[T]he adolescent
brain is a brain in flux, undergoing numerous regressive and progressive changes
in mesocorticolimbic regions.").
110. See Dahl, supra note 84, at 60 (arguing that affect regulation relates to the
control of feelings and behavior and "involves some inhibition, delay, or intentional
change of emotional expression or behavior to conform with learned social rules, to
meet long-term goals, or to avoid future negative consequences"); Staci A. Gruber &
Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice,
3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 330 (2006) ("An adolescent's level of cortical
development may therefore be directly related to her or his ability to perform well
in situations requiring executive cognitive skills. Younger, less cortically mature
adolescents may be more at risk for engaging in impulsive behavior than their
older peers . . . .").
111. Laurence Steinberg, A Dual Systems Model of Adolescent Risk-Taking, 52
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 216, 217 (2010); Laurence Steinberg, A Social
Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78,
91-92 (2008).
112. See PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE 9 (Eric R. Kandel et al. eds., 4th ed.
2000) (describing specialized functions of lobes of the brain and reporting that
"[t]he frontal lobe is largely concerned with planning future action and with the
control of movement"); Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 110, at 323 ("The
frontal cortex has been shown to play a major role in the performance of executive
functions including short term or working memory, motor set and planning,
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reasoning, planning, and impulse control."' During late-
adolescence, increased myelination"' and synaptic pruning"' of the
PFC increase cognitive function, reasoning ability, and impulse
control."'
attention, inhibitory control and decision making."); Sowell et al., Mapping
Continued Brain Growth, supra note 109, at 8819 (describing brain growth in post-
adolescents "in the superior frontal regions that control executive cognitive
functioning"); Frontline: Inside the Teenage Brain-Interview with Jay Giedd (PBS
television broadcast, Mar. 31, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontlinelshows/teenbrain/interviews/giedd.html ("The frontal lobe is often called
the CEO, or the executive of the brain. It's involved in things like planning and
strategizing and organizing, initiating attention and stopping and starting and
shifting attention."); B.J. Casey, et al., The Adolescent Brain, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL
REV. 62, 68 (2008) (declaring that the brain's ability to control behavior continues
to mature through late adolescence).
113. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) operates as the CEO of the brain and controls
planning, goal-directed responses, risk assessment, and impulse control. See, e.g.,
B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain Development and Its Relation to
Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 244 (2000) (associating PFC
with a variety of cognitive abilities and behavior control); Deborah Yurgelun-Todd,
Emotional and Cognitive Changes During Adolescence, 17 CURRENT OPINION IN
NEUROBIOLOGY 251, 253 (2007); R.K. Lenroot & Jay N. Giedd, Brain Development
in Children and Adolescents: Insights from Anatomical Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 718, 723 (2006) (reporting
that adolescents are less able to self-regulate or control behavior).
114. Myelin is a white, fatty substance that forms a sheath that insulates the
neural axons and facilitates more rapid and efficient neurotransmission.
Myelination in the frontal cortex improves brain function by acting like the
insulation of a wire to increase the speed of neural electro-conductivity. Zoltan
Nagy, Helena Westerberg & Torkel Klingberg, Maturation of White Matter is
Associated with the Development of Cognitive Functions During Childhood, 16 J.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1227, 1231 (2004); ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE
EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND 144 (2001) (explaining
that "the presence of myelin makes communication between different parts of the
brain faster and more reliable").
115. The gray matter or brain cell neurons that cover the top layer of the brain
begin to thin through a process of synaptic pruning which eliminates unused
neuronal connections. The elimination of unused connections promotes greater
efficiency and strengthens the brain's ability to process complex information. B.J.
Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain Development and Its Relation to
Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 241 (2000) (reporting that
"increasing cognitive capacity during childhood may coincide with a gradual loss [of
grey matter] rather than formation of new synapses"); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic
Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early
Adulthood, 101 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 8174, 8175 (2004).
116. See PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE, supra note 112, at 147-48 (describing
the role of myelination of axons in speeding conduction velocity and noting that
'conduction in myelinated axons is typically faster than in nonmyelinated axons of
the same diameter"); Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 110, at 325:
The significant correlations between white matter volume and processing
speed are consistent with evidence suggesting that increased myelination
of axons produces faster conduction velocity of neural signals and more
efficient processing of information, and further suggests that some of the
increased cognitive abilities characteristic of adult maturation may be
associated with developmental increases in relative white matter volume.
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The limbic system controls instinctual behavior, such as the
fight-or-flight response."' Adolescents rely more heavily on the
limbic system and less heavily on the PFC than do adults."'
During adolescence, the two systems are out of balance as limbic
system activity increases while the prefrontal regulatory system
lags behind. Pleasure-seeking and emotional reward responses
develop more rapidly than does the system for self-control and self-
regulation. Youths' impulsive behavior reflects a gut response
rather than sober reflection."' The presence of peers stimulates
greater neural activity in the reward centers of the brain and
further increases risk-taking."o The slower development of the
Id.; see also Paus et al., supra note 109, at 1908:
The smooth flow of neural impulses throughout the brain allows for
information to be integrated across the many spatially segregated brain
regions involved in these functions. The speed of neural transmission
depends not only on the synapse, but also on structural properties of the
connecting fibers, including the axon diameter and the thickness of the
insulating myelin sheath.
Id.; see also Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth, supra note 109, at
8828 ("[I]t is likely that the visuospatial functions typically associated with parietal
lobes are operating at a more mature level earlier than the executive functions
typically associated with frontal brain regions.").
117. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF NEURAL SCIENCE, supra note 112, at 986-93
(describing role of amygdala in mediating between emotions and cognition); Abigail
A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition
in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
195, 195 (1999) (reporting that the amygdala is "a neural system that evolved to
detect danger and produce rapid protective responses without conscious
participation").
118. See Baird et al., supra note 117, at 198 (showing that processing of emotions
shifted from the amygdala to the frontal lobe over the course of the teenage years);
Stephanie Burnett et al., Development During Adolescence of the Neural Process of
Social Emotion, 21 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 173, 173 (2009); S.J. Blakemore,
Adolescent Development of the Neural Circuitry for Thinking About Intentions, 2
SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 130 (2007).
119. See David E. Arredondo, Child Development, Children's Mental Health and
the Juvenile Justice System, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 15 (2003):
Adolescents tend to process emotionally charged decisions in the limbic
system, the part of the brain charged with instinctive (and often
impulsive) reactions. Most adults use more of their frontal cortex, the part
of the brain responsible for reasoned and thoughtful responses. This is one
reason why adolescents tend to be more intensely emotional, impulsive,
and willing to take risks than their adult counterparts.
Id.; see also Dahl, supra note 84, at 64:
These affective influences are relevant ... to many day-to-day 'decisions'
that are made at the level of gut feelings about what to do in a particular
situation (rather than any conscious computation of probabilities and risk
value). These gut feelings appear to be the products of affective systems in
the brain that are performing computations that are largely outside
conscious awareness (except for the feelings they evoke).
Id.
120. Albert Chein, et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by Enhancing
Activity in the Brain's Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. at F8 (noting
290 Law and Inequality [Vol. 31:263
PFC impulse-control system in relation to the limbic reward-
seeking system likely contributes to youths' risk taking, poor
judgment, and criminal involvement."'
The neuroscience helps to explain adolescents' impulsive
behavior. Scientists have not established a direct link between
brain development and real-life behavior, nor found a way to
individualize among young offenders on the basis of brain
development. 12 However, the research helps explain why
adolescents make risky decisions and respond more robustly to
peer influences.12'
3. Peer Group and Community Influences
Roper also attributed youths' reduced culpability to their
greater susceptibility to negative peer influences.124 Normal
adolescent risk-taking and delinquent behavior interact with
environmental features. Juveniles commit crimes in groups to a
greater extent than do adults, which increases risks of accessorial
liability for crimes they did not intend or personally commit.125
that with adolescents, "awareness of peers selectively amplifies activity in the
brain's incentive processing system, which in turn influences subsequent decisions
about risk").
121. Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral Scientist Looks at the Science of
Adolescent Brain Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 161-62 (2010).
122. Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 769 (2011) (contending that "the data support
conclusions only at the aggregate level, [but] they shed little light on the
developmental status of any given young person, except insofar as she is a member
of the group. While links between structural attributes, brain-level functional data,
and externalized behaviors are strengthening, they remain largely speculative.");
Aronson, supra note 84, at 136 (emphasizing "lack of clear causal pathway from
brain structure to behavior"); Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems,
in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 157
(Brent Garland ed., 2004) (explaining that as long as the law assumes that people
are rational, the biological causes of their behavior are legally irrelevant).
123. See Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 405-06 (2006)
(arguing that the simple fact of neuron-anatomical differences between adolescent
and adult brains do not compel differences in how the law responds to them).
124. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (noting adolescent
susceptibility to negative peer influences); Scott, supra note 81, at 1643-44
(describing adolescent responsiveness to peer influences); Scott & Steinberg, supra
note 72, at 813 ("(T]eens are more responsive to peer influence than are adults.
Susceptibility to peer influence increases between childhood and early adolescence
as adolescents begin to individuate from parental control. This susceptibility peaks
around age fourteen and declines slowly during the high-school years.").
125. Police arrest two or more juveniles for committing a single crime more often
than they do adults. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some
Implications of a Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 870 (1981)
(noting that sixty-four percent of robberies committed by people under age twenty-
one were committed in groups while only thirty-nine percent of robberies
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Susceptibility to peer influences interacts with risk propensity and
youths engage in riskier behavior together than they would when
alone.126 A juvenile may make a spur-of-the-moment decision to
commit a crime with accomplices fearing social rejection if he
refuses."' Significantly, the defendants in Roper, Graham, Miller,
and Jackson all committed their crimes with one or more co-
offenders. Youths' ability to resist peer influences approaches that
of adults in the late teens and early twenties.'28 Youths' reduced
committed by people twenty-one and older were committed in groups). Group
offending increases youths' prospects for prosecution as accessories and exposes
them to the same criminal penalties as principals. See, e.g., ZIMRING, supra note
21, at 152 (1998) ("Accessorial liability can interact with the vulnerability of
adolescents to group pressure to create very marginal conditions for extensive
criminal sanctions."); Scott & Grisso, supra note 78, at 162 ("Peer influence seems
to operate through two means: social comparison and conformity. Through social
comparison, adolescents measure their own behavior by comparing it to others.
Social conformity . .. influences adolescents to adapt their behavior and attitudes
to that [sic] of their peers."); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 89, at 153-54 ("The
choice to engage in antisocial conduct is often linked to the adolescent's desire for
peer approval. Prodding by peers can substitute for, and even overwhelm, an
adolescent's own 'better' judgment about whether to engage in certain conduct.").
126. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 815 ("[A] synergy likely exists
between adolescent peer orientation and risk-taking; considerable evidence
indicates that people generally make riskier decisions in groups than they do
alone."). One scholar argues:
That social settings account for the majority of all youth crime suggests
that the capacity to deflect or resist peer pressure is a crucially necessary
dimension of being law-abiding in adolescence.... Kids who do not know
how to deal with such pressure lack effective control of the situations that
place them most at risk of crime in their teens.
Zimring, supra note 74, at 282; see also Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer
Influence on Risk-Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in
Adolescence and Adulthood, 4 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 625-26 (2005)
("[A]dolescents are usually accompanied by one or more persons when committing
crimes. . . . This is not, however true of adults; when adults commit crimes, they
typically do so alone.").
127. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 22.
128. Zimring contends:
A teen may know right from wrong and may even have developed the
capacity to control his or her impulses while alone, but resisting
temptation while alone is a different task than resisting the pressure to
commit an offense when adolescent peers are pushing for misbehavior and
waiting to see whether or not the outcome they desire will occur.
Zimring, supra note 74, at 280; see also Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 126, at
626 ("When confronted with risky decisions in the context of a peer group,
adolescents, and perhaps even young adults, may be less able than older adults to
resist the influence of their risk-prone age mates."); Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn
C. Monahan, Age Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 1531, 1531 (2007) (reporting that "[tihere is little doubt that peers
actually influence each other and that the effects of peer influence are stronger
during adolescence than in adulthood"); Franklin E. Zimring, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 477, 488-490 (1998) (noting
that "[tihe ability to resist peer pressure is yet another social skill that is a
necessary part of legal obedience and is not fully developed in many adolescents").
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ability to resist peer pressures diminishes criminal responsibility
compared with adults."9
II. Graham v. Florida: Reframing Proportionality for
Juvenile Offenders
Roper prohibited executing adolescents because of immature
judgment and limited self-control.o Before Graham, the Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence asserted that "death is
different."'"' However, the diminished responsibility that
precludes the death penalty reduces youths' blameworthiness for
all other sentences as well.12
A. Graham v. Florida: "Death is Different" No Longer
Prior to Graham, the Court had not applied proportionality
principles to length-of-year sentences for juveniles or set a
minimum age for LWOP sentences."' As a result, appellate courts
129. See, e.g., Zimring, supra note 74, at 282 ("But if social experience in matters
such as anger and impulse-management also counts, and a fair opportunity to learn
to deal with peer pressures is regarded as important, expecting the experience-
based ability to resist impulses and peers to be fully formed prior to age eighteen or
nineteen would seem on present evidence to be wishful thinking.").
130. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
131. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) ("Proportionality
review is one of several respects in which we have held that 'death is different,' and
have imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else provides."); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (recognizing "'that the imposition of death by
public authority is . . . profoundly different from all other penalties'" (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978))); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272
(1980) (noting the Court's death penalty cases have limited applicability "[blecause
a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter
how long"); see also John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011) (analyzing the Court's
dual-track proportionality analyses and distinction between capital and non-capital
sentence review).
132. Professor Zimring argues:
Doctrines of diminished responsibility have their greatest impact when
large injuries have been caused by actors not fully capable of
understanding and self-control. The visible importance of diminished
responsibility in these cases arises because the punishments provided for
the fully culpable are quite severe, and the reductive impact of mitigating
punishment is correspondingly large. But if the doctrine of diminished
responsibility means anything in relation to the punishment of immature
offenders, its impact cannot be limited to trivial cases. Diminished
responsibility is either generally applicable or generally unpersuasive as a
mitigating principle.
ZIMRING, supra note 21, at 84.
133. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) ("The present case
involves an issue the Court has not considered previously: a categorical challenge
to a term-of-years sentence."); CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 5
(noting various state statutes which allow youths to be tried in adult courts);
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did not review the mandatory minimum or LWOP sentences that
judges imposed on juveniles.'34 Although penal proportionality
relates the seriousness of a crime-harm and culpability-to the
sentence imposed,'' courts used a circular logic, and reasoned that
a crime is serious because of the injury inflicted, and focused on
harm rather than culpability.
In Graham v. Florida, sixteen-year-old Terrance Graham and
three companions attempted to rob a restaurant, for which he pled
guilty and received a three-year probationary term with an initial
twelve months in jail."' Shortly after his release from jail and
while on probation, Graham and two companions committed two
armed home invasion robberies."' The trial judge revoked
Graham's earlier probation, rejected the state's recommendation
CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 69 (summarizing a North
Carolina statute allowing children as young as thirteen to be transferred to adult
courts where they could be sentenced to life without parole). But cf Naovarath v.
State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (questioning the constitutionality of imposing
a LWOP sentence on any thirteen-year-old, but overturning sentence on narrower
grounds).
134. See Cepparulo, supra note 57, at 225 ("Because adults are still subject to
the possibility of death, they are afforded this proportionality analysis. For
juveniles no longer facing death, the opportunity to introduce mitigating evidence
is lost."); Logan, supra note 74, at 708-09 ("[Sltates are free to impose ... LWOP on
those under sixteen . . .. As a result youths . . . can be required to spend the rest of
their lives in an adult prison without a chance of meaningful appellate review of
their sentences. And from the perspective of a majority of American appellate
courts, this mandatory decision is immune from review because, by definition, the
sentence cannot . . qualify as 'grossly disproportionate.'").
135. Stinneford, supra note 131, at 916 (2011) ("From a retributive point of view,
a punishment is proportionate to the offense if it matches the offender's moral
culpability or desert."); see also Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 67, 73 (2005) (contending retribution is the theory that "offenders should be
punished in proportion to their blameworthiness (or desert) in committing the
crime being sentenced").
136. See, e.g., State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). The court
upheld a mandatory sentence of life without parole imposed on a thirteen-year-old
convicted of aggravated murder, stating:
The test is whether in view of contemporary standards of elemental
decency, the punishment is of such disproportionate character to the
offense as to shock the general conscience and violate principles of
fundamental fairness. That test does not embody an element or
consideration of the defendants age, only a balance between the crime and
the sentence imposed. Therefore, there is no cause to create a distinction
between a juvenile and an adult who are sentenced to life without parole
for first degree aggravated murder.
Id. at 348 (citations omitted); see also State v. Stinnett, 497 S.E.2d 696, 701-02
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on fifteen-
year-old convicted of murder and noting that "when a punishment does not exceed
the limits fixed by statute, the punishment cannot be classified as cruel and
unusual in a constitutional sense").
137. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
138. Id. at 2018-19.
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for a thirty-year term, and sentenced him to life without
possibility of parole."' Graham claimed that life without parole for
a non-homicide offense violated the Eight Amendment and Roper's
recognition of youths' reduced responsibility.'40
In Graham, Justice Kennedy identified two lines of Eighth
Amendment proportionality cases. One line of cases involved
challenges to length-of-year sentences that greatly exceeded the
gravity of the offense--"gross disproportionality.""' The other line
of cases barred the death penalty for classes of offenders or
offenses-"categorical disproportionality"-e.g., juveniles in Roper,
defendants with mental retardation in Atkins, and non-homicide
offenses."' Although the language and history of the Eighth
Amendment do not dictate different tests for capital and non-
capital sentences, the Court employed dual tracks of
proportionality analyses based on its view that "death is
different.""'
When defendants challenged length-of-years sentences, the
Court considered whether the Eighth Amendment contains a
"narrow proportionality principle" that "applies to non-capital
sentences.""' Rummel v. Estelle held that a state did not violate
the Eighth Amendment when it sentenced a three-time, minor
property offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole. 4'
Three years later, Solem v. Helm held that a sentence of life
without possibility of parole for a recidivist convicted of a property
139. Id. at 2019-20.
140. Id. at 2020-22.
141. Id. at 2021-22.
142. Id. at 2021, 2022. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)
(prohibiting execution for raping a child); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
(barring execution for felony murderer who did not kill or intend to kill victim);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (stopping execution for rape of an adult
woman); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (banning execution for felony
murderer who did not kill or intend to kill).
143. Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 49, 49
(2010); Richard S. Frase, Graham's Good News - and Not, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 54,
54 (2010) (noting the "Court's previous two-track distinction between death and
prison sentences"); Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT'G
REP. 58, 58 (2010) (noting that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
"proceeded along two tracks-capital and noncapital, with the two tracks applying
different tests and leading to different outcomes").
144. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (elaborating upon principles of
"narrow proportionality" review in non-capital cases); Frase, supra note 73, at 576-
88 (reviewing Supreme Court's criminal sentencing proportionality decisions).
145. 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980) (approving Rummel's sentence, under a
recidivism statute, for his third conviction for relatively minor property crimes).
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crime violated the Constitution.' Solem's proportionality analysis
focused on three factors: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."'
Harmelin v. Michigan upheld a life without parole sentence
imposed on a first-time drug dealer, although the fractured Court
could not agree on a constitutional rationale.'" Justice Kennedy's
Harmelin concurrence provided the operative rule to assess
disproportionate sentences.' After Harmelin, courts conduct
Solem's comparative review only if a length-of-years sentence
crosses a "grossly disproportionate" threshold."o The Court
applied those factors in Ewing v. California and upheld a sentence
of twenty-five years to life for theft of three golf clubs."'
The Court's death penalty proportionality cases examined the
constitutionality of capital punishment for certain categories of
146. 463 U.S. 277, 281-82, 303 (1983). The Court noted that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment "prohibits ... sentences that
are disproportionate to the crime committed" and that "the constitutional principle
of proportionality has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century."
Id. at 284, 286.
147. Id. at 292. Despite the elements of recidivism, the distinguishing factor in
Solem was the imposition of a LWOP sentence for a minor property crime. See id.
at 297.
148. Compare Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (Scalia, J.) (announcing the opinion of
the Court and arguing that proportionality principle only limited application of the
death penalty but did not constitute a general feature of Eighth Amendment
analysis), with id. at 997, 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (upholding sentence by
finding it proportional under an Eighth Amendment analysis).
149. Id. at 1001 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment prohibits "only extreme
sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime"); Frase, supra note 73, at
581-83 (analyzing Harmelin and the factors Justice Kennedy proposed).
150. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998-1001 (Kennedy J., concurring). According
to Justice Kennedy:
All of these principles-the primacy of the legislature, the variety of
legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the
requirement that proportionality review be guided by objective factors-
inform the final one: The Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only
extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime.
Id. at 1001. See Barkow, supra note 143, at 49 (noting that "the Court applied an
exceedingly deferential proportionality test" based on Kennedy's Harmelin
concurrence); Frase, supra note 73, at 581-83 (analyzing the factors Kennedy
proposed in Harmelin and the limited utility they provide defendants challenging a
disproportionate sentence).
151. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19-20, 30-31 (2003) ("We hold that
Ewing's sentence of 25 years to life in prison, imposed for the offense of felony
grand theft under the three strikes law, is not grossly disproportionate and
therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments.").
Law and Inequality
offenses or offenders.1"' Some decisions barred capital punishment
for non-homicide crimes and less culpable felony-murderers.153
Others, such as Roper and Atkins, prohibited states from executing
less culpable offenders-juveniles and defendants with mental
retardation. "4
Graham arose at the intersection of these two lines of cases-
"a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence.""' Rather
than review whether an individual's sentence was grossly
disproportionate, the Court considered the validity of a sentencing
practice-life without parole-as applied "to an entire class of
offenders who have committed a range of crimes." 5' Graham
repudiated the Court's historical "death is different" distinction,
extended Roper's categorical reduced culpability rationale, and
"declare[d] an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital
sentence . . . ."' The Court distinguished Harmelin because
Graham raised a categorical rather than individual sentence
proportionality challenge."'
Once the Court framed Graham's challenge in categorical
terms, it replicated its Roper proportionality analyses and found a
national consensus against sentencing non-homicide juvenile
offenders to LWOP."' Although thirty-seven states authorized
LWOP sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders, few states,
152. Frase, supra note 143, at 54 (noting that "death is different" for categories
of offenders-e.g., juveniles-and categories of offenses-e.g., non-homicide crimes).
153. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring execution of
youths who committed their crimes while younger than eighteen); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 301 (2002) (denying execution of defendants with mental
retardation).
155. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010); Leslie Patrice Wallace,
"And I Don't Know Why It Is That You Threw Your Life Away": Abolishing Life
Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to
Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 53-57 (2010)
(analyzing the two lines of cases).
156. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
157. See id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (complaining that "[tloday's
decision eviscerates that distinction. 'Death is different' no longer.").
158. Id. at 2022; Barkow, supra note 143, at 49 (reporting that "the Court
concluded that Harmelin's threshold test that required a finding of gross
disproportionality between the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty
'does not advance the analysis"'). Instead, the Court summarily asserted that "'the
appropriate analysis is the one used in cases that involved the categorical
approach.'" Id.; Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy's Vision
of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 66, 67
(2010) (noting the Court's application of capital punishment analysis to a term-of-
years sentencing practice to exempt an entire class of offenders).
159. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
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other than Florida, actually imposed it.'" Graham reiterated a
concern earlier expressed in Thompson v. Oklahoma, that the
interaction of laws that allowed transfer of juveniles to criminal
court and generic sentencing provisions that exposed juvenile non-
homicide offenders to life without parole "does not justify a
judgment that many States intended to subject such offenders to
life without parole sentences."'
Graham rested on three features-the offender, the offense,
and the length of sentence. Graham's proportionality analysis
considered "the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their
crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the
punishment in question."'62 It reiterated the three reasons why
juveniles' reduced culpability warrants less severe punishment
than adults convicted of the same crime." Although Roper cited
scant social science evidence, Graham explicitly endorsed
developmental psychological and neuroscience research to bolster
its conclusions about youths' diminished responsibility:
"[DIevelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For
example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue
to mature through late adolescence.""
Drawing on its felony-murder death-penalty decisions,
Graham concluded that even the most serious non-homicide
crimes "cannot be compared to murder in their severity and
160. Id. at 2024. The Court notes:
[T]here are 123 juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving life without parole
sentences. A significant majority of those, 77 in total, are serving
sentences imposed in Florida. The other 46 are imprisoned in just 10
States. . . . Thus only 11 jurisdictions nationwide in fact impose life
without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide offenders-and most of
those do so quite rarely-while 26 states . . . do not impose them despite
apparent statutory authorization.
Id. (citations omitted).
161. Id. at 2025; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988) (noting
transfer laws demonstrate "that the States consider 15-year-olds to be old enough
to be tried in criminal court for serious crimes, . . . but tells us nothing about the
judgment these States have made regarding the appropriate punishment for such
youthful offenders").
162. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
163. The Court states:
[J]uveniles have a 'lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility'; they 'are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure'; and their
characters are 'not as well formed.' . . . A juvenile is not absolved of
responsibility for his actions, but his transgression "is not as morally





irrevocability."'" The criminal responsibility of juveniles who did
not murder was "doubly-diminished" and could not support a
LWOP sentence.'66
Graham reviewed the penal justifications for LWOP
sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders-retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-and concluded that
none justified the penultimate sanction.'6 ' Although execution
differs from imprisonment, death sentences and LWOP for
juveniles were similarly ultimate sanctions-"the sentence alters
the offender's life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable." 6 8 It denies
the offender hope or the prospect of redemption. 6 9 Moreover, a
juvenile who receives a LWOP sentence will serve more years and
a larger percentage of his or her life in prison than would an older
offender.' Graham concluded that the marginal deterrent effect
of a LWOP sentence on a juvenile cannot justify the sentence.
While incapacitation might reduce risk of future offending, a judge
cannot predict at the time of sentencing that a "juvenile offender
forever will be a danger to society" or will remain irredeemably
incorrigible.17' Finally, a LWOP sentence deprives a young
offender of incentive or opportunity to grow and change.' 71 Many
165. Id. at 2027. See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008)
(barring the death penalty for rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977 ) (banning the death penalty for rape of an adult woman).
166. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027 (noting that "when compared to an adult
murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice
diminished moral culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime
each bear on the analysis.").
167. Id. at 2028.
168. Id. at 2027.
169. Id. (reporting that a LWOP sentence "deprives the convict of the most basic
liberties without giving hope of restoration, . . . [Tihis sentence 'means denial of
hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it
means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the
convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days'"); see also Alice Ristroph,
Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 23 FED. SENT'G REP. 75, 76 (2010)
(arguing that "[hiope, or its denial, distinguishes LWOP from other prison
sentences - not irrevocability, and not any necessary difference in the actual length
of incarceration").
170. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (arguing that "[u]nder this sentence a juvenile
offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in
prison than an adult offender. A 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to
life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.").
171. Id. at 2029.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Court noted that "[a] young person who knows that he or she has
no chance to leave prison before life's end has little incentive to become a
responsible individual. . . . A categorical rule against life without parole for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders avoids the perverse consequence in which the lack of
maturity that led to an offender's crime is reinforced by the prison term." Id. at
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states deny offenders sentenced to LWOP access to vocational
training programs or rehabilitative services afforded to those who
may return to the community."' Largely as a result of "the limited
culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders . . . and the severity
of life without parole sentences," Graham held that states may not
impose a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who
did not commit homicide.' 5
The Court applied its rule categorically to all juveniles and
denied judges . and juries the opportunity to impose LWOP
sentences on a case-by-case basis.'76 Graham re-emphasized the
inability of clinicians or jurists to distinguish between the
incorrigible few and the vast majority of juveniles who have the
capacity to change."' Moreover, youths' immaturity and
compromised competence increase the risk of error in fact-finding
and assessments of culpability."'
[Tihe features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put
them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.
Juveniles mistrust adults and have limited understanding of
the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional
actors within it. They are less likely than adults to work
effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense. Difficulty
in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel seen as
part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects, all can lead
to poor decisions . . . . [and] impair the quality of a juvenile
defendant's representation.
Trial competence requires a person to be able to understand
proceedings, make rational decisions, and assist counsel. 80
2032-33.
174. Id. at 2033 ("It is the policy in some prisons to withhold counseling,
education, and rehabilitation programs for those who are ineligible for parole
consideration."); see also ASHLEY NELLIS, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS
FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 4 (2012) (describing how most juvenile lifers do not
participate in vocational training or rehabilitative programs because of state or
prison policies).
175. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
176. Id. at 2030-33.
177. Id. at 2029, 2032.
178. Birckhead, supra note 158, at 69 (arguing that juveniles' mistrust of
authority figures and limited understanding of the justice system impair their
ability to work effectively with counsel, putting them at a distinct disadvantage in
criminal proceedings); HUM. RTs. WATCH, "WHEN I DIE . . . THEY'LL SEND ME
HOME": YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA, AN
UPDATE 5 (2012) [hereinafter WHEN I DIE . .. THEY'LL SEND ME HOME] (reporting
that "lylouth are often poorly represented and do not always adequately
understand legal proceedings").
179. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
180. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (holding that "a person
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature
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Developmental limitations impair youths' competence similarly to
how mental illness or retardation renders adults incompetent."
Psychologists report significant age-related differences between
adolescents' and adults' competence, quality of judgment, and legal
decisions.'" Developmental differences impair youths' ability to
communicate with counsel, to concentrate, to provide information
about the crime, to recognize exculpatory facts, and to make legal
decisions.' Age and intelligence interact and produce higher
levels of incompetence to stand trial among adolescents with low
IQs than adults with low IQs.'" Even nominally competent
and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial"); Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that a defendant must possess "sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding . . . [and have] a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him"); Richard J. Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative
Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 73, 76 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz
eds., 2000); see also Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A
Comparison of Adolescents' and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 333, 335 (2003) [hereinafter Grisso et al., Juvenile's Competence to
Stand Trial] (contending that adjudicative competence requires "a basic
comprehension of the purpose and nature of the trial process (Understanding), the
capacity to provide relevant information to counsel and to process information
(Reasoning), and the ability to apply information to one's own situation in a
manner that is neither distorted nor irrational (Appreciation)").
181. Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the
Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 353, 374-78 (2001); Elizabeth S.
Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juvenile
Justice Policy, 76 N.C. L. REV. 793, 796 (2005); see Thomas Grisso, The Competence
of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 6 (1997)
[hereinafter Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents].
182. Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 180, at 344.
Thirty percent of eleven to thirteen year olds and nineteen percent of fourteen to
fifteen year olds exhibited deficits of reasoning and understanding comparable to
that of adults found incompetent. Id. A significant proportion of those younger
than sixteen were incompetent, and many older youths exhibited substantial
impairments. Id.; see also Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 180, at 87-88; Vance L.
Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Delinquency
Proceedings: Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 629, 652 (1995); Redding & Frost, supra note 181, at 374-78.
183. See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5
ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 47, 63 (2009); Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to
Stand Trial, supra note 180, at 343; Frase, supra note 143, at 56 (noting that
juvenile defendants pose greater risks of unwise litigation choices, poorer
communication with counsel, and an increased risk of ineffective defense
representation and likelihood that they will receive an unconstitutionally harsher
sentence).
184. See Grisso et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 180, at
356:
[Aipproximately one fifth of 14- to 15-year-olds are as impaired in
capacities relevant to adjudicative competence as are seriously mentally ill
adults who would likely be considered incompetent to stand trial by
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adolescents often made poorer decisions than did young adults."
Youths' compromised competence bears on their ability to exercise
Miranda rights.186 Juveniles' propensity to confess falsely
buttresses the Court's concern that their vulnerability may
undermine the reliability of criminal proceedings."'
Graham opted for a categorical rule to give juveniles an
opportunity to change and demonstrate maturity. Like the death
penalty, a LWOP sentence effectively extinguishes the offender's
life.'" However, Graham gave the 123 non-homicide youths
serving LWOP sentences very limited relief. It required states to
provide them with "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release
clinicians who perform evaluations for courts.... Not surprisingly,
juveniles of below-average intelligence are more likely than juveniles of
average intelligence to be impaired in abilities relevant for competence to
stand trial. Because a greater proportion of youths in the juvenile justice
system than in the community are of below-average intelligence, the risk
for incompetence to stand trial is therefore even greater among
adolescents who are in the justice system than it is among adolescents in
the community.
Id.
185. See Scott & Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence, supra note 78, at 159-60;
Steinberg & Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom, supra note 78, at 409.
186. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE
INTERROGATION ROOM (2013) (pointing out problems for juveniles fifteen and under
in understanding Miranda rights, especially because many delinquents already
suffer from educational deficits, learning disabilities and other limitations);
THOMAS GRIsso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS 124 (1981) (observing how
juveniles' understanding of the right to remain silent was qualified by their
perceptions of court hearings as disallowing or taking away that right); Grisso,
supra note 181, at 12 (discussing a study where forty-five percent of adolescents,
compared with seventy-four percent of adults, demonstrated partial understanding
of Miranda warnings); Jodi Viljoen et al., Adjudicative Competence and
Comprehension of Miranda Rights in Adolescent Defendants, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1,
9 (2007) (showing significantly higher impairment for defendants fifteen and under
in basic understanding of Miranda rights).
187. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 945 (2004) (detailing that police elicited
one-third of all false confessions from offenders under eighteen); Samuel L. Gross et
al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544-45 (2006) (noting that among 340 exonerees, juveniles were
three times more likely to have confessed falsely than adults); Joshua A. Tepfer et
al., Arresting Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 887,
904 (2010) (reporting that youths are almost twice as likely as wrongfully convicted
adults to have confessed falsely).
188. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (noting that "[life in prison
without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls,
no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope"); Eva S. Nilsen, From Harmelin
to Graham - Justice Kennedy Stakes out a Path to Proportional Punishment, 23
FED. SENT'G REP. 67, 69 (2010) (acknowledging the inconsistency between
rehabilitation and LWOP sentences that "forswear[ altogether the idea that the
defendant can change"); Wallace, supra note 155, at 58 (explaining that the
rationale of Graham should also preclude lengthy term of year sentences that deny
juveniles hope of release as well as LWOP).
302 Law and Inequality [Vol. 31:263
based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation."'" However,
the Court did not define states' responsibilities to provide youths
with the means to change or identify when they would become
eligible for parole.' Must a state provide youths with
rehabilitative programs to give them a "meaningful opportunity"
to mature and change?19' Would a parole review hearing after
forty years satisfy the Court's expectation of "some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release?""' Graham emphasized that parole
consideration would not guarantee an offender's eventual
release,"' and remitted to the states responsibility to develop "the
means and mechanisms for compliance.""'
Chief Justice Roberts concurred that Graham's LWOP
sentence was disproportionate to his crime and culpability, but
insisted that sentences should be individualized, rather than
applied to the entire category of young offenders.'" The Court's
189. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030; see also Nilsen, supra note 188, at 69
(discussing that "[t]he state is required to give juveniles a chance to reform
themselves and must revisit the life sentencing in something akin to a parole
hearing").
190. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Wlhat, exactly,
does . . . a 'meaningful' opportunity [to obtain release] entail? When must it occur?
And what Eighth Amendment principles will govern review by the parole boards
the Court now demands that States empanel? The Court provides no answers to
these questions . . . ."); see also Ristroph, supra note 169, at 76 (noting that Graham
"requires only the opportunity to obtain release, not a guarantee of eventual
release. Much will depend on the nature of parole review as established by the
states, and on the decision makers in individual cases .... ); Wallace, supra note
155, at 66 (summarizing questioning during oral argument in which Graham's
counsel conceded that parole eligibility after forty years or grant of parole to one
out of twenty applicants would be constitutional).
191. See, e.g., Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity for Release Equals
Rehabilitation? How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity for Release,
16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 12 (2011) (arguing that states "must employ a
rehabilitative model for incarceration of juveniles" in separate youth prisons to
realistically comply with Graham's requirement of "meaningful opportunity" for
reform).
192. Wallace, supra note 155, at 66.
193. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. The Court asserted that:
It bears emphasis, however, that while the Eighth Amendment forbids a
State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile
nonhomicide offender, it does not require the State to release that offender
during his natural life. Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as
juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of
incarceration for the duration of their lives. The Eighth Amendment does
not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes
committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for life. It does forbid
States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never
will be fit to reenter society.
Id. at 2030.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2036-37.
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previous non-capital proportionality decisions defined the
seriousness of the crime on the basis of the harm caused"' and did
not include individualized assessment of an offender's
culpability."' To find Graham's penalty disproportionate, Chief
Justice Roberts had to modify the Court's proportionality analyses
to include "culpability of the offender."" His case-specific
proportionality inquiry incorporated "Roper's conclusion that
juveniles are typically less blameworthy than adults . . . ."19
Because Graham's youthfulness supported an inference of gross
disproportionality, Roberts compared his LWOP sentence with
those imposed on others convicted of similar crimes in Florida,
sentences imposed on those convicted of more serious crimes, and
sentences imposed on similar offenders in other jurisdictions.200
Although he viewed Graham's sentence as "exceptional,"2 01 Roberts
rejected a categorical bar of LWOPs for all non-homicide juvenile
offenders.2 0 2 However, he did not explain how Graham's sentence
differed from those imposed on other youths who might
constitutionally receive LWOP sentences for non-homicide
*203
crimes.
Justice Thomas' dissent strongly criticized the Graham
majority for repudiating prior Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
that "death is different."20 4 He castigated the majority's categorical
196. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
197. Harris v. Wright, 93 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1996). The court rejected a
fifteen-year-old juvenile's proportionality challenge to a mandatory LWOP sentence
and held that the Eighth Amendment bars only "grossly disproportionate"
sentences. Id. at 584-85. Judge Alex Kozinski asserted:
Youth has no obvious bearing on this problem: If we can discern no clear
line for adults, neither can we for youths. Accordingly, while capital
punishment is unique and must be treated specially, mandatory life
without parole is, for young and old alike, only an outlying point on the
continuum of prison sentences.
Id. at 585.
198. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2039. Justice Roberts asserted that the Court's prior
proportionality analyses included only consideration of the "offender's mental state
and motive in committing the crime, the actual harm caused to his victim or to
society by his conduct, and any prior criminal history." Id. at 2037.
199. Id. at 2039.
200. Id. at 2040-41.
201. Id. at 2041-42 (noting that "Florida is an outlier in its willingness to impose
sentences of life without parole on juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes").
202. Id. at 2042 (arguing that "[slome crimes are so heinous, and some juvenile
offenders so highly culpable, that a sentence of life without parole may be entirely
justified under the Constitution").
203. See, e.g., Frase, supra note 143, at 54 (noting that "Justice Roberts'
concurrence continued to apply a standard of 'gross disproportionality' without
saying what that means-disproportionate relative to what?").
204. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046. Justice Thomas objected that:
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ban of a non-capital sentence.205 He condemned its disregard of the
laws of thirty-seven states that authorized LWOPs for non-
homicide offenders, emphasized the increased use of LWOP
sentences, and noted its imposition on 123 juveniles in eleven
states.20 While adolescents as a class may be less culpable than
adults, Justice Thomas rejected the conclusion that every youth
always lacks the culpability to warrant a LWOP sentence.207 He
argued that judges or juries could individualize sentences and
balance the heinousness of a crime and a youth's diminished
responsibility. 2" Finally, he pointed to the anomaly of finding
youths' culpability diminished for non-homicide crimes, but
leaving "intact state and federal laws that permit life-without-
parole sentences for juveniles who commit homicide."2 " This
amounted to disproportionality based on categories of crimes
rather than characteristics of offenders. 210  Although Graham
involved a less culpable offender, a less culpable offense, and a
LWOP sentence,21 1 the Court quickly addressed this inconsistency.
Until today, the Court has based its categorical proportionality rulings on
the notion that the Constitution gives special protection to capital
defendants because the death penalty is a uniquely severe punishment
that must be reserved for only those who are "most deserving of
execution." . . . Today's decision eviscerates that distinction. "Death is
different" no longer. The Court now claims not only the power categorically
to reserve the "most severe punishment" for those the Court thinks are
"'the most deserving of execution,'" but also to declare that "less culpable"
persons are categorically exempt from the "second most severe penalty."
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2047. Justice Thomas complained that the majority's reinvigorated
non-capital proportionality analysis "impose[s] a categorical proportionality rule
banning life-without-parole sentences not just in this case, but in every case
involving a juvenile nonhomicide offender, no matter what the circumstances." Id.
206. Id. at 2050.
207. Id. at 2055.
208. Id. (arguing that "[tihe integrity of our criminal justice system depends on
the ability of citizens to stand between the defendant and an outraged public and
dispassionately determine his guilt and the proper amount of punishment based on
the evidence presented").
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2056. Justice Thomas objected that:
[Tihe Court's conclusion that life-without parole sentences are 'grossly
disproportionate' for juvenile nonhomicide offenders in fact has very little
to do with its view of juveniles, and much more to do with its perception
that 'defendants who do not kill, intend to kill or foresee that life will be
taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of
punishment than are murderers.
Id.
211. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun Shine
In: The Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off
Approaches to Eighth Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT'G REP.
79 (2010) (noting that the combination of three factors led to the result in
Graham-juvenile offenders, conviction for a non-homicide crime, and a LWOP
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III. Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs: No
Mandatory LWOP Sentences Because "Children Are
Different"
Forty-two states permit judges to impose LWOP sentences on
all offenders-adults or juveniles-convicted of murder.1 Twenty-
seven states make a LWOP sentence for any offender-juvenile or
adult-convicted of murder mandatory.' Mandatory LWOP
sentences preclude individualized consideration of culpability or
the circumstances of the crime, and create a non-rebuttable
presumption that the criminal responsibility of juveniles and
adults are equal.' Some states abrogated the common-law
infancy defense and removed the only substantive criminal law
protection for youth prior to conviction.2 5 Courts rarely found
juvenile LWOP sentences disproportional,216 and the vast majority
sentence); Wallace, supra note 155, at 59 (2010) ("The very essence of Graham's
reasoning should also preclude life without parole even for juvenile murderers....
[Bly stating that juveniles are less culpable than adults ... [t]he Court's reasoning
does not distinguish between the non-homicide and homicide juvenile offender.").
212. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 25 n.44 (listing
states' LWOP sentencing provisions).
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583-85 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a
fifteen-year-old juvenile's constitutional challenge to a mandatory LWOP sentence
imposed for murder); Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming a
mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on an illiterate, mildly retarded sixteen-year-
old murderer, even though the statute excluded consideration of any mitigating
factors, including youthfulness, and holding that "we cannot find any basis in
decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment, or in any other source of guidance to
the meaning of 'cruel and unusual punishments,' [sic] for concluding that the
sentence in this case was unconstitutionally severe").
Defining the seriousness of an offense solely by the harm caused excludes
from a proportionality review any individualized consideration of diminished
responsibility. See Brink, supra note 77, at 1576 ("[E]ven if juveniles cause the
same harm as their adult counterparts, they are less culpable, because less
responsible, because less normatively competent."); Logan, supra note 74, at 703
("By divorcing 'crime' from offender culpability in proportionality analysis, these
courts subscribe to an essentially circular inquiry: because murder, for instance, is
a very 'serious' crime in the eyes of the legislature, it can be met with a very
'serious' statutory punishment."); In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968, 969 (2002) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (advocating proportionality analyses that include an evaluation of
the offender's culpability).
215. Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy
Defense, 54 KAN. L. REV. 687, 689-92 (reporting that several states-Washington,
Florida, North Carolina, Illinois, and Colorado expressly bar consideration of
infancy defense and deem twelve and thirteen-year-old defendants the moral
equals of adults). Carter reports that in four of these states, sentencing statutes
require judges to impose mandatory sentences without regard to the age of the
defendant even if the child was less than fourteen years of age at the time of the
crime. Id. at 740-41.
216. See, e.g., Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1968)
(prohibiting life sentence for fourteen-year-old convicted of rape because "[t]he
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upheld them against juveniles' pleas to consider youthfulness as a
mitigating factor.2" States that do not formally impose LWOP
sentences on juveniles allow judges to create virtual life sentences
with stacked consecutive terms.2 18
Courts regularly uphold mandatory LWOP sentences and
extremely long terms of imprisonment imposed on twelve- through
intent of the legislature in providing a penalty of life imprisonment without benefit
of parole ... was to deal with dangerous and incorrigible individuals who would be
a constant threat to society. We believe that incorrigibility is inconsistent with
youth."); Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (Nev. 1989) (finding that LWOP
sentence imposed on thirteen-year-old convicted of murder violated state
constitution provisions against cruel and unusual punishment but granting only
limited right to be considered for parole eligibility in the distant future).
A few courts have reduced youths' lengthy sentences because of their age or
immaturity. See, e.g., People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726-27 (Cal. 1983) (reducing
life sentence imposed on seventeen-year-old convicted of felony murder because he
"was an unusually immature youth"); People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 308 (Ill.
2002) (rejecting as disproportional a LWOP sentencing imposed on a fifteen-year-
old, passive accessory to a felony-murder and holding that "a mandatory sentence
of natural life in prison with no possibility of parole grossly distorts the factual
realities of the case and does not accurately represent defendant's personal
culpability such that it shocks the moral sense of the community").
217. See, e.g., Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. Ct. App. 2003) (opposing the
argument that "a life sentence without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual
punishment on a twelve-year-old child"); Edmonds v. State, 955 So. 2d 864, 895-97
(Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (approving a LWOP sentence imposed on a youth convicted of
murder committed at thirteen years of age); State v. Foley, 456 So. 2d 979, 984 (La.
1984) (affirming LWOP sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old juvenile convicted of
rape); State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636, 644 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding LWOP
sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old); Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d 912, 918 (Miss.
1995) (endorsing LWOP sentence imposed on fourteen-year-old convicted of aiding
and abetting murder); State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832 (N.C. 1998) (upholding
life imprisonment sentence for thirteen-year-old convicted of rape, recognizing that
"the chronological age of a defendant is a factor that can be considered in
determining whether a punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime," but
emphasizing that Green was morally responsible for the crime because he
possessed sufficient mental capacity to form criminal intent); State v. Standard,
569 S.E.2d 325, 329 (S.C. 2002) (confirming a "two-strike" LWOP sentence imposed
on a fifteen-year-old convicted of burglary based on his prior juvenile conviction for
a serious felony, a sentence presumably invalid after Graham); Paul G. Morrissey,
Do the Adult Crime, Do the Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel and Unusual
Implications for a 13-Year-Old Sex Offender Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in
State v. Green, 44 VILL. L. REV. 707, 738 (1999); AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTs.
WATCH, supra note 16, at 1 (noting that when courts sentence children as adults,
"the punishment is all too often no different from that given to adults").
218. After the court of appeals overturned an invalid LWOP sentence imposed on
a fifteen-year-old juvenile, the trial judge in People v. Demirdjian simply
resentenced him to two consecutive life sentences. People v. Demirdjian, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 184, 188-89 (Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that while California law prohibits
sentencing juveniles under sixteen years of age to life without parole, the court
dismissed the juvenile's reliance on Roper v. Simmons and emphasized the clear
difference between death and lesser sentences); Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279,
1284 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding a 100-year sentence imposed on a thirteen-year-
old juvenile for burglary, rape, and robbery).
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sixteen-year-old youths.2 1 9 One of every six juveniles who received
a LWOP sentence was fifteen years of age or younger when they
committed the crime for which they were sentenced.2 2 o More than
half (fifty-nine percent) of juveniles received a LWOP sentence for
the first crime for which they were convicted.22' One-quarter
(twenty-six percent) received a LWOP sentence for a felony
murder in which they were an accessory, rather than the
principal, as the defendant in Jackson.222 Although the Court's
death penalty decisions-Eddings, Thompson, and Roper-treated
youthfulness as a mitigating factor, many trial judges treat it as
an aggravating factor and sentence juvenile murderers more
severely than their adult counterparts.2 22 Youths convicted of
219. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 1-6. See, e.g., People
v. Moya, 899 P.2d 212, 219-20 (Colo. App. 1994) (affirming that sentence of life
imprisonment with possibility of parole after forty years was not cruel and unusual
punishment when imposed on a juvenile convicted of robbery and murder);
Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 1999) (vacating death penalty imposed on
sixteen-year-old convicted of murder and reducing sentence to life imprisonment
without a possibility of parole); State v. Broadhead, 814 P.2d 401, 406-07 (Idaho
1991) (overruled on other grounds) (affirming life sentence with fixed minimum of
fifteen years imposed on fourteen-year-old convicted of murdering his father); State
v. Shanahan, 994 P.2d 1059, 1061-63 n.1 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (holding that life
sentence for murder imposed on fifteen-year-old did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment); State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d 636, 642-44 (La. App. 1955)
(approving life without parole sentence of fifteen-year-old convicted of murder);
State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 488-90 (Minn. 1998) (confirming that
mandatory life imprisonment for fifteen-year-old convicted of first-degree murder
was not cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Ira, 43 P.3d 359, 365-70 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2002) (affirming sentence of ninety-one years imposed on fifteen-year-old for
rape); State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613, 623-25 (S.D. 1998) (deciding that life
imprisonment without possibility of parole for fourteen-year-old convicted of
murder is not cruel and unusual punishment); State v. Taylor, No. 02C01-9501-CR-
00029, 1996 WL 580997, at 22-24 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 1996) (sentence of life
without parole plus sixty years imposed on sixteen-year-old convicted of robbery,
rape, and felony murder); State v. Massey, 803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)
(endorsing mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on youth convicted of committing
murder at thirteen years of age).
220. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 1.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1-2.
223. In Roper v. Simmons, defense counsel urged the jury to consider the
defendant's youthfulness as a mitigating factor "in deciding just what sort of
punishment to make." 543 U.S. 551, 558 (2005). In rebuttal, the prosecutor
responded "Age, he says. Think about age. Seventeen-years-old. Isn't that scary?
Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the
contrary." Id. The prosecutor's view of youthfulness as an aggravating factor is
reflected in sentencing practices. Donna Bishop & Charles Fraizer, Consequences
of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 227, 236-37 (Jeffrey
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (comparing the sentences imposed on
youths transferred to criminal courts with those of adults and noting that
"transferred youths are sentenced more harshly, both in terms of the probability of
receiving a prison sentence and the length of the sentences they receive. In other
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murder are more likely to enter prison with LWOP sentences than
are adults convicted of murder.224
Prior to the 1970s, few states imposed LWOP sentences and
most had indeterminate sentencing laws that allowed for parole
release.225 Get-tough policies that gathered momentum in the
1970s included both resumption of capital punishment and
adoption of LWOP sentences.226 During the 1980s and 1990s,
states reduced judicial discretion, enacted mandatory minimum
and LWOP sentences, and reduced or eliminated parole
eligibility.27  By 2005, forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia had enacted LWOP sentences.228 Death penalty
abolitionists had supported LWOP sentences as an alternative to
capital punishment. 22 9  Despite widespread adoption of LWOP
words, we see no evidence that criminal courts recognize a need to mitigate
sentences based on considerations of age and immaturity."); see also David S.
Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, "Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused": The
Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 641,
665 (citing the impact of "get tough" politics and arguing that "[bly the mid-1990's
[sic], youth had ceased to be a mitigating factor in adult court, and instead had
become a liability").
224. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 33 (reporting that
judges imposed LWOP sentences on juveniles convicted of murder more frequently
than they did adults and concluding that "states have often been more punitive
toward children who commit murder than adults," and that "age has not been much
of a mitigating factor in the sentencing of youth convicted of murder"); WHEN I DIE.
. . THEY'LL SEND ME HOME, supra note 178, at 4 (reporting that "in more than half
the cases where there was an adult co-defendant, the adult received a lower
sentence than the young person who was sentenced to life without parole").
225. MAUER ET AL., supra note 31, at 5-8 (explaining that indeterminate
sentences and parole meant that many prisoners sentenced to "life" typically served
terms of five, fifteen, or twenty years); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6-
13 (1996) (describing indeterminate sentencing systems and the shift to
determinate sentencing and elimination of parole).
226. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 154-55 (1976) (reauthorizing the death
penalty after the Court's earlier decision invalidated state death penalty statutes
(citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972))); see supra note 19 and
accompanying text (describing politics of "get tough" on crime); ASHLEY NELLIS &
RYAN S. KING, No EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 5-11
(2009) (describing expanded use of life and LWOP sentences increase of people
serving life sentences from 34,000 in 1984 to 140,610 in 2008), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/pulibcations/publications/inc noexitseptembe
r2009.pdf.
227. See, MAUER ET AL., supra note 31, at 1 (attributing increase in length of
prisoners' sentences since the 1970s to police changes such as "mandatory
sentencing, 'truth in sentencing,' and cutbacks in parole release"); TONRY, supra
note 225, at 6-13 (summarizing changes in sentencing laws in the 1970s and
1980s).
228. A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on
Capital Punishment, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1838, 1842 (2006) [hereinafter Life and
Death].
229. Id. at 1938 (arguing that death penalty abolitionists promoted life without
parole sentences as an alternative to executions); see also MAUER ET AL., supra note
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sentences, the number of people sentenced to death remained
relatively stable, and judges imposed LWOP sentences on many
more defendants who were never death-eligible."'o Thus, LWOP
sentences had a net-widening effect.231
As of 2004, 2,225 people were serving LWOP sentences for
crimes they committed as children, and Roper added more youths
to their cumulative ranks."' By 2009, the number had risen to
more than 2,500.233 Before 1980, judges rarely imposed LWOP
sentences on children; they now sentence youths to LWOP three
times as often as they did in 1990.234 Although juveniles averaged
sixteen years of age at the time they committed the crimes for
which they received LWOP sentences, judges have imposed LWOP
sentences on children as young as twelve or thirteen.2 35 We can
safely assume that the number of juveniles serving virtual life
sentences-i.e., stacked consecutive terms totaling 50-100 years or
more-is much larger than those who received LWOP sentences.'
Most juveniles who received a LWOP sentence had no prior adult
or juvenile convictions.2 States may not execute a felony-
31, at 5 (suggesting increased imposition of LWOP sentences as an alternative to
the death penalty).
230. Life and Death, supra note 228, at 1848-51 (attributing decline in capital
sentences to decreased public and jury support for the death penalty because of
greater sense of safety associated with a reduction in violent crime).
231. See id. at 1839 ("Twenty years of experience with life-without-parole
statutes shows that although they have only a small effect on reducing executions,
they have doubled and tripled the lengths of sentences for offenders who never
would have been sentenced to death or even been eligible for the death penalty.");
Id. at 1851-52 (reporting that from 1992 and 2003, the number of inmates on death
row increased from 2,575 to 3,374, a thirty-one percent rise, while the number of
prisoners serving life without parole sentences grew from 12,453 to 33,633, a 170%
increase); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 211, at 79 (2010) (noting that "many
inmates who would not have received death sentences now languish under LWOP
sentences as a result of death penalty reform efforts").
232. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 1.
233. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, 2009 WORLD REPORT, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79365 (estimating 2,502 youths serving LWOP
sentences for crimes committed while younger than eighteen years of age); WHEN I
DIE ... THEY'LL SEND ME HOME, supra note 178, at 2 (reporting that "the number of
youth sentenced to life without parole in the US as risen to 2570"); ASHLEY NELLIS
& RYAN S. KING, supra note 226 at 17-25 (summarizing number, location, and
ethnic composition of offenders serving life sentences for crimes committed as
juveniles).
234. Id. at 2.
235. Id. at 25 (extrapolating and estimating that about 354 youths are serving
LWOP sentences for crimes committed at age fifteen or younger).
236. See, e.g., ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, supra note 226 at 3, 17 (reporting
that 6,807 juveniles serving life sentences are serving life with the possibility of
parole).
237. Id. at 28.
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murderer who did not kill or intend to kill,238 but more than one-
quarter of juveniles who received LWOP sentences were convicted
for felony-murders.' In Michigan, courts convicted nearly half
the juveniles serving LWOP sentences as accessories rather than
as principals.240 Judges impose LWOP sentences on Black
juveniles at rates ten times greater than they do White youths,
and Blacks comprise the majority of all youths serving LWOP
sentences.4' The LWOP disparity reflects every prior
discretionary decision that juvenile and criminal justice personnel
make that treat Black youths more harshly than White
offenders."' Despite comprising fifteen percent of the youth
population, Black juveniles make up more than two-thirds (sixty-
nine percent) of all juveniles serving LWOP sentences.
A. Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs: "Children are
constitutionally different from adults"'
Evan Miller was fourteen years old at the time of his crime
and had lived a chaotic childhood. 2 45 After a neighbor came to
make a drug deal with Miller's mother, Miller and a companion
returned to the neighbor's trailer, smoked marijuana, and
consumed alcohol. 246 The neighbor subsequently passed out, and
238. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (holding the death penalty
unconstitutional when imposed on felony murder defendant who did not kill,
attempt to kill, or intend to kill).
239. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 27-28; WHEN I DIE..
THEY'LL SEND ME HOME, supra note 178, at 4 (reporting that nearly half of youths
sentenced to LWOP did not actually commit the murder).
240. DEBORAH LABELLE, SECOND CHANCES: JUVENILEs SERVING LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS 4 (2004), available at www.aclumich.org/pubs/
juvenilelifers.pdf; WHEN I DIE . . . THEY'LL SEND ME HOME, supra note 178, at 4
(depicting substantial racial disparities in California: "African American youth are
sentenced to life without parole at a rate that is 18.3 times the rate for [W]hite
youth").
241. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTs. WATCH, supra note 16, at 39.
242. See MALES & MACALLAIR, supra note 35, at 8 (explaining that judges are
eight times more likely to sentence Black youths than White youths to
imprisonment); JOAN MCCORD ET AL., JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE 229-60
(2001) (documenting cumulative effect of racially disparate decisions at each stage
of the juvenile justice system); POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 35 (finding
disproportionate minority overrepresentation at each stage of the juvenile justice
system).
243. LABELLE, supra note 240, at 6.
244. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 (2012).
245. Id. Miller had been in and out of foster care, suffered abuse by his step-
father, regularly used drugs and alcohol, and had attempted suicide four times
beginning when he was six years old. Id. at 2462.
246. Id.
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Miller stole his wallet and split $300 with his companion." When
he tried to return the wallet, the neighbor awoke and grabbed him.
Miller's confederate hit the victim with a baseball bat and once
freed, Miller grabbed the bat and struck him repeatedly. Miller
covered his victim's head with a sheet, told him "'I am God, I've
come to take your life,"' and struck a final blow." The boys left
the trailer, but soon returned to cover up their crime by setting it
on fire. Their victim died from his injuries and smoke
inhalation.' The prosecutor charged Miller as an adult with
murder in the course of arson which carried a mandatory LWOP
sentence.250
Kuntrell Jackson, then fourteen years old, accompanied two
other boys who decided to rob a store."' While en route, Jackson
discovered that one of the boys had a sawed-off shotgun.252 While
Jackson remained outside the store, the other boys went in,
pointed the gun at the clerk, and demanded money. After Jackson
entered and found his companion demanding money, the clerk
threatened to call the police and the other boy shot and killed
her.2" The prosecutor charged Jackson with capital felony murder
and aggravated robbery, and following his conviction, the court
imposed a mandatory LWOP sentence.2" Jackson subsequently
filed a state habeas corpus petition based on Roper and Graham,
and argued that a mandatory LWOP sentence for a fourteen-year-
old violates the Eighth Amendment.255 The Arkansas Supreme
Court dismissed his petition.25' Two dissenting justices argued
that a mandatory LWOP sentence violated Graham's admonition
that "'[a]n offender's age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment,
and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants'
youthfulness into account at all would be flawed."'257
The Court in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs
followed the rationale of Roper and Graham to their logical
conclusion and banned mandatory LWOP sentences for youths
247. Id.
248. Id.






255. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012).
256. Id. at 2461 (reasoning that "Roper and Graham were 'narrowly tailored' to
their contexts: 'death-penalty cases involving a juvenile and life-imprisonment-
without-parole cases for non-homicide offenses involving a juvenile'").
257. Id at 2462.
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convicted of murder.' Responding to Justice Thomas' Graham
dissent, Justice Kagan emphasized that "none of what it said
about children-about their distinctive (and transitory) mental
traits and environmental vulnerabilities-is crime specific."2 " She
postulated that "[tihe concept of proportionality is central to the
Eighth Amendment," and precludes "sentencing practices based on
mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the
severity of a penalty."260  Roper barred the death penalty for all
children and Graham equated a non-homicide juvenile's LWOP
sentence with the death penalty.26' Miller/Jackson invoked the
Court's death penalty precedents and required an individualized
culpability assessment to impose a LWOP sentence on a youth
convicted of murder.262 For more than three decades, the Court
barred mandatory imposition of the death penalty and required
individualized assessments.26 3 Mandatory capital sentences
precluded consideration of the crime, the offender, and relevant
mitigating circumstances.26
Miller/Jackson reaffirmed the constitutional premise that
258. Id. at 2458 (noting that "[Graham's] reasoning implicates any life without
parole sentence for a juvenile, even as its categorical bar relates only to
nonhomicide offenses").
259. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2012).
260. Id. at 2463.
261. Id. at 2466 (explaining that Graham "viewed this ultimate penalty for
juveniles as akin to the death penalty, [and] we treated it similarly to that most
severe punishment").
262. Justice Kagan emphasized that "children are constitutionally different from
adults for purposes of sentencing." Id. at 2464. She invoked the Court's death
penalty jurisprudence to require "individualized sentencing for defendants facing
the most serious penalties." Id. at 2461. She noted that "[i]n those cases, we have
prohibited mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that sentencing
authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense
before sentencing him to death." Id. at 2463-64. See, e.g., Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
263. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (holding that "in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires
consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense . . ."). Woodson condemned:
A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the character
and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense [which] excludes . . . the possibility of compassionate or mitigating
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of mankind. It treats all
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass ....
Id.
264. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74 (1987) (requiring the sentencing
authority to consider mitigating circumstances relative to the offense and the
defendant as an individual); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989)
(mandating "reasoned moral response" that reflects offender's individual
culpability).
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youths' reduced culpability warranted less severe punishment
than adults' because of immaturity, susceptibility to peer
influences, and transitional personality development.2
Mandatory LWOP sentences prevent the sentencing judge from
considering youthfulness or other mitigating factors and thereby
disproportionally equate the culpability of juveniles and adults."'
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark
features-among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure
to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking into
account the family and home environment that surrounds
him-and from which he cannot usually extricate himself-no
matter how brutal or dysfunctional. It neglects the
circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of
his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he
might have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if
not for incompetencies [sic] associated with youth-for
example, his inability to deal with police officers or
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity
to assist his own attorneys. And finally, this mandatory
punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation even
265. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for
reform, we explained, "they are less deserving of the most severe
punishments." . . . First, children have a "lack of maturity and
underdeveloped sense of responsibility," leading to recklessness,
impulsivity, and heedless risk taking. Second, children "are more
vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures," including
from their family and peers; they have "limited control] over their own
environment" and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific,
crime producing settings. And third, a child's character is not as "well
formed" as an adult's; his traits are "less fixed" and his actions less likely
to be "evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity]."
Id. (citations omitted). The Court also reasoned that developmental psychology and
neuroscience bolstered its conclusion that youths' crimes were less blameworthy or
deterrable. Id. at 2465.
Because "'Itihe heart of the retribution rationale'" related to an offender's
blameworthiness,'" the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as
with an adult.'" Nor can deterrence do the work in this context, because
"'the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults'"
-their immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity-make them less likely
to consider potential punishment."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010)).
266. Id. at 2467 ("Such mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a
sentencer from taking account of an offender's age and the wealth of characteristics
and circumstances attendant to it."); see also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993) (requiring the sentencer to consider "the mitigating qualities of youth").
The Court noted that the fifteen jurisdictions in which judges have discretion
to impose LWOP sentences on juveniles only accounted for fifteen percent of
youths, whereas the twenty-nine jurisdictions in which LWOP is mandatory
accounted for eighty-five percent of all youths sentenced. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471.
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when the circumstances most suggest it. 2 67
An individualized culpability assessment coupled with youths'
generic diminished responsibility should severely restrict
instances in which a LWOP sentence could be imposed.2 8
Justice Thomas' Miller/Jackson dissent observed that
Harmelin v. Michigan previously upheld a mandatory LWOP
sentence for an adult and did not require individualized
sentencing. 269 However, Justice Kagan distinguished Harmelin on
the grounds that a sentencing scheme appropriate for adults could
still violate the constitution when applied to children. "We have
by now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule
permissible for adults may not be so for children. . . . So if (as
Harmelin recognized) 'death is different,' children are different
too."270
Chief Justice Roberts' dissent objected that the majority of
states approved mandatory LWOP sentences for adults and
juveniles convicted of murder, hence no national consensus against
the practice existed.2 " The majority responded that
Miller/Jackson did not bar the practice, but only required
individualized evaluations that take youthfulness into account
before meting out the most severe penalties.2  It reiterated the
concern expressed in Thompson v. Oklahoma that the interaction
of two separate statutes-waiver of youths to criminal court and
sentencing of convicted criminals-could produce a harsher
outcome than the legislature intended."' In many jurisdictions,
267. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
268. Id. at 2481, 2471 n.10 ("[Wie think appropriate occasions for sentencing
juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. . . . When given the
choice, sentencers impose life without parole on children relatively rarely.").
269. Id. at 2483.
270. Id. at 2470 (stating that Roper and Graham invalidated punishments for
children that could be imposed on adults).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 2471 (noting that "[o]ur decision does not categorically bar a penalty
for a class of offenders or type of crime . . . [but] mandates only that a sentence
follow a certain process-considering an offender's youth and attendant
characteristics before imposing a particular penalty.").
273. Id. at 2472 (recognizing that the interaction of independent statutes-
transfer to adult court and penalties for people convicted in criminal court-made it
"impossible to say whether a legislature had endorsed a given penalty for children
(or would do so if presented with the choice)"). Justice Kagan observed that:
Most States do not have separate penalty provisions for those [waived]
juvenile offenders. Of the 29 jurisdictions mandating life without parole for
children, more than half do so by virtue of generally applicable penalty
provisions, imposing the sentence without regard to age. And indeed, some
of those States set no minimum age for who may be transferred to adult
court in the first instance, thus applying life without parole mandates to
children of any age-be it 17 or 14 or 10 or 6.
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transfer is automatic for youths charged with murder.274 Even in
jurisdictions that conduct judicial waiver hearings, the issues of
waiver-amenability to treatment-and the age limits of juvenile
court jurisdiction pose different questions than the amount of
punishment a youth convicted of murder deserved."'
Although Jackson was convicted of felony-murder as an
accomplice rather than as the shooter, his mandatory sentence
precluded consideration of his "intentions, expectations, and
actions.""6 Graham already recognized the "twice diminished"
moral culpability of youths "who do not kill, intend to kill, or
foresee that life will be taken," and this rationale applies equally
to youths convicted of felony murder who did not kill or intend to
kill."' Following Graham's logic,278 Justice Breyer's concurrence in
Miller/Jackson reasoned that a juvenile who neither killed nor
intended to kill is no more culpable than a youth convicted of a
non-homicide felony.279 "Given Graham's reasoning, the kinds of
homicide that can subject a juvenile offender to life without parole
must exclude instances where the juvenile himself neither kills
nor intends to kill the victim.. .. [Where the juvenile neither kills
nor intends to kill, both features emphasized in Graham as
extenuating apply."280 The concurrence endorsed the Court's
felony-murder decisions that limited the death penalty to those
who killed or intended to kill.281
Id. at 2473.
The dissent questioned the majority's contention that a "legislature is so
ignorant of its own laws that it does not understand that two of them interact with
each other. . . . [Here the widespread and recent imposition of the sentence makes
it implausible to characterize this sentencing practice as a collateral consequence of
legislative ignorance." Id. at 2479-80.
274. See, e.g., PATRICK GRIFFIN, SEAN ADDIE, BENJAMIN ADAMS & KATHY
FIRESTINE, TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS
AND REPORTING 5 (2011).
275. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (noting that "the question at transfer hearings
may differ dramatically from the issue at a post-trial sentencing[,]" and judges
confront an extreme forced choice between lenient sanctions as a juvenile and
standard punishment as an adult).
276. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982).
277. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010).
278. Id. at 2027 (finding that children "who did not kill or intend to kill" have a
"twice diminished" culpability based on their age and the nature of their crime).
279. Id. at 2475-76.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782; Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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IV. Youth Discount: Categorical Recognition of
Youthfulness as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing
Miller/Jackson requires courts to conduct individualized
culpability assessments and to recognize the mitigating role of
youthfulness in sentencing.282  However, like Graham's earlier
instructions to provide "some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,""8 the
decisions provide judges and parole boards with no practical
guidance on how to consider youthfulness in sentencing or release
decisions. Instead, states should formally incorporate the
principle of youthfulness as a mitigating factor as part of their
sentencing statutes.2 8
Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson affirm that the principle
of youthfulness as a mitigating factor applies both to capital and
2885
non-capital sentences. States can hold youths accountable and
recognize their diminished responsibility without excusing their
criminal conduct.28 Youths who produce the same harms as adults
282. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012) (instructing judges "to
consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty
for juveniles").
283. Id. at 2469.
284. As the Court repeatedly has recognized:
[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that
minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and
responsible than adults. Particularly "during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective,
and judgment" expected of adults.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)).
285. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2482 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts
noted:
The principle behind today's decisions seems to be only that because
juveniles are different from adults, they must be sentenced differently.
There is no clear reason that principle would not bar all mandatory
sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence as harsh as what a
similarly situated adult would receive.
Id.
286. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 78, at 174 (arguing that youthfulness does
not excuse criminal liability, but that liability should not be equivalent to that of
adults); Scott, Lessons, supra note 94, at 309:
Adolescents' choices] reflect immaturity and inexperience and are driven
by developmental factors that will change in predictable and systemic
ways. A legal response that holds young offenders accountable, while
recognizing that they are less culpable than their adult counterparts,
serves the purposes of criminal punishment without violating the
underlying principle of proportionality.
Id.; see also Zimring, supra note 74, at 278 ("[Elven after a youth passes the
minimum threshold of competence that leads to a finding of capacity to commit
316 [Vol. 31:263
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are not their moral equals."' Countries other than the United
States routinely recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor as a
"principle of fundamental justice."'8 States' sentencing laws can
recognize developmental differences and protect young people from
the full consequences of immature decisions.289
Despite the Court's preference for individualized culpability
assessments, Roper and Graham opted for a categorical
prohibition because "[t]he differences between juvenile and adult
offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing a
youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability."2 90 The Court feared that when confronted with a
heinous crime a jury could not properly consider youthfulness as a
mitigating factor."' Roper and Graham concluded that because
clinicians cannot distinguish between the vast majority of
immature juveniles who deserve leniency and the rare youth who
might exhibit adult-like culpability, it would not allow a jury to do
292SO.
crime, the barely competent youth is not as culpable and therefore not as deserving
of a full measure of punishment as a fully qualified adult offender.").
287. See ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 144
("[Wihenever a young offender's need for protection, education, and skill
development can be accommodated without frustrating community security, there
is a government obligation to do so."); Feld, Legislative Exclusion, supra note 17, at
99; Scott & Grisso, supra note 78, at 182 ("Subjecting thirteen-year-old offenders to
the same criminal punishment that is imposed on adults offends the principles that
define the boundaries of criminal responsibility."); ABA, THE STATE OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 329 (2007) ("[Adolescents'] crimes may be the same as those of adults, but
these offenders simply are not adults and should not be sentenced as if they
were.").
288. See, e.g., R. v. D.B., [2008] S.C.C. 25 (Can.) (reasoning that "young people
are entitled to a presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness or culpability
flowing from the fact that, because of their age, they have heightened vulnerability,
less maturity, and a reduced capacity for moral judgment").
289. See Scott, supra note 81, at 1656 ("[I]f the values that drive risky choices
are associated with youth, and predictably will change with maturity, then our
paternalistic inclination is to protect the young decisionmaker . .. from his or her
bad judgment."); see also ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at
96, 142-45.
290. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2004)).
291. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 ("An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality
or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating
arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's
objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a
sentence less severe than death.").
292. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 ("It is difficult even for expert psychologists
to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.") (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 573).
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Some commentators," Chief Justice Roberts in Graham,"
and the dissents in all three cases advocate individualized
culpability assessments prior to imposing a LWOP sentence.
However, a categorical rule that treats youthfulness as an
unconditional mitigating factor is preferable to a system of guided
discretion.2 " Graham,2" as well as Roper, endorsed categorical
treatment even though the Justices recognized individual
variability in culpability.
The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not
disappear when an individual turns 18. By the same token,
some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some
adults will never reach. .. . The age of 18 is the point where
society draws the line for many purposes between childhood
and adulthood. It is, we conclude, the age at which the line for
death eligibility ought to rest.297
The Court reasoned that a clear-cut rule which occasionally under-
punishes the rare, fully-culpable adolescent still will produce less
aggregate injustice than a discretionary system that improperly,
harshly sentences many more undeserving youths.2 9 8
Categorical treatment of adolescents' reduced culpability
rests on the moral principle that all youths deserve less
punishment than adults because of their lesser
293. See, e.g., Cepparulo, supra note 57, at 253 (arguing against mandatory
LWOPs for juveniles and proposing that "[n]o juvenile should be given a
punishment as solemn as LWOP without an individual assessment of
proportionality in relation to the crime committed"); Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile
Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of Years?, 86 TUL. L. REV.
309, 312-14 (2012) (criticizing Graham for failing to recognize that some non-
homicide offenders commit such horrific crimes that they deserve LWOP
sentences); ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 149-52
(contending that age is an incomplete proxy for culpability and proposing
individualized culpability assessments without specifying the factors judges would
consider); Massey, supra note 28, at 1109-14 (advocating for individualized
proportionality review prior to imposition of a LWOP sentence).
294. 130 S. Ct. at 2042 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (cautioning that "[o]ur system
depends upon sentencing judges applying their reasoned judgment to each case
that comes before them").
295. Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons
for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 9, 57 (2008) ("Although some commentators advocate individualized
culpability assessments prior to imposing an LWOP sentence on a juvenile, a
bright-line rule like Roper's that categorically treats youthfulness as a mitigating
factor is preferable to a system of guided discretion.").
296. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2016-17.
297. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
298. Id. at 573 ("If trained psychiatrists with the advantage of clinical testing
and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing any juvenile
under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that States should
refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation-that a juvenile
offender merits the death penalty.").
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blameworthiness.2" All adolescents share similar characteristics
of immature judgment and lack of self-control that reduce their
culpability and all young offenders should receive categorical
reductions of adult sentences.3 0o To treat youthfulness as a
mitigating factor represents a moral and criminal policy judgment
that no child deserves to be sentenced as severely as an adult who
causes the same harm."o' "Even if there are a few juveniles who
could be among the worst of society's offenders, jurors will make
errors of unacceptable frequency and magnitude. For this reason,
we cannot trust ourselves to decide that a child is culpable enough
to be punished as an adult....
There are two reasons to prefer a categorical rule of
mitigation over individualized sentencing discretion.3 ' The first is
the inability to define or identify what constitutes adult-like
culpability among offending youths.o" Culpability is not an
299. In contemporary criminal law theory, penal proportionality may reflect
either the quality of an actor's choice or what that choice indicates about the actor's
moral character. The former focuses on the blameworthiness of the choices made,
while the latter focuses on what that choice indicates about the actor's bad
character. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 801-02; see also R.A. Duff,
Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345, 367-68 (1993);
Michael Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, in PLACING BLAME 548, 574-92
(1997); Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, supra note 122, at 405 ("The
criteria for responsibility are behavioral and normative, not empirically
demonstrable states of the brain."); Ward, supra note 81, at 461.
300. See Morse, supra note 122; Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 801
("Because these developmental factors influence their criminal choices, young
wrongdoers are less blameworthy than adults under conventional criminal law
conceptions of mitigation.").
301. See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 40, at 242.
[Adolescence, per se, is a mitigating status because youths' developmental
deficits] are not the deficits of an atypical adolescent but are "normal"
developmental processes common to all adolescents. To the degree that
there is variation among adolescents, whether offenders or not, these
differences are predictable and subject to a variety of contextual,
circumstantial and intra-individual factors. In this jurisprudence, the
crimes of adolescents are a function of immaturity, compared to the crimes
of adults, which are the acts of morally responsible, yet possibly cognitively
and emotionally deficient actors.
Id.
302. Emens, supra note 55, at 87.
303. Brink, supra note 77, at 1578 (arguing that age provides an imperfect
boundary marker for immaturity and proposing to use age as a rebuttable
presumption of incapacity to achieve individualized justice).
304. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 396-99 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 48 ("[While] the
rate at which the adolescent brain acquires adult capabilities differs from
individual to individual ... researchers have identified broad patterns of change in
adolescents that begin with puberty and continue into young adulthood."); Morse,
supra note 82, at 62 (observing that "there are no reliable and valid measures" of
culpability that accurately can distinguish adolescents from adults).
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objectively measurable object, but a normative construct about
criminal responsibility.05 It is a policy judgment based on reliable
evidence while a few youths may appear mature prior to becoming
eighteen years of age, many others will not be mature even as
adults.0o Despite individual developmental variability, clinicians
lack the tools with which to assess impulsivity, foresight, and
preference for risk, or a metric by which to relate maturity of
judgment with criminal responsibility."' The vast majority of
juveniles' crimes are less blameworthy than adults and the
inability to define immaturity or to validly identify a few
responsible ones could introduce a systematic bias that over-
punishes less-culpable youths."' A categ6rical rule reduces the
risk of over-punishment of less blameworthy youths." Other
305. See Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment, supra note 40, at 500.
306. See Brink, supra note 77, at 1570 (arguing that the development of
normative competence is part of the maturation process from childhood to
adulthood). "Though not all individuals mature at the same rate, and some
individuals never mature, this sort of normative maturation is strongly correlated
with age. The reduced normative competence of juveniles provides a retributive
justification for reduced punishment for juveniles." Id.; see also ZIMRING,
AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 148 ("The range of individual
variation among youths of the same age is notoriously large."); Fagan, supra note
40, at 209 ("The age at which adolescents realize the developmental competencies
that constitute culpability will vary: a significant number of juveniles will be
immature and lacking in the developmental attributes of culpability well before age
eighteen, and some may still lack these competencies after age eighteen. . . .").
307. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005); ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH
VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 148 ("[We lack] good data on the social skills and social
experience of adolescent offenders. The important elements of penal maturity have
yet to be agreed upon, let alone assessed in large numbers of cases.").
308. See, e.g., Fagan, supra note 40, at 248 ("The difficulties and statistical error
rates in measuring immaturity for juveniles invite complexity in the consistent
application of the law."). Fagan contends:
Even when individualized assessments are conducted using modem
scientific and clinical tools, the risks of error due to measurement and
diagnostic limitations suggest that it is neither reliable nor efficient for
each court to assess the competency of each juvenile individually. The
precise conditions of immaturity, incapacity, and incompetency are
difficult to consistently and fairly express in a capital sentencing context.
Further, cognitive and volitional immaturity might be easily concealed by
demeanor or physical appearance and, more importantly, obscured by the
gruesome details of a murder and its emotional impact on the victim's
family.
Id. at 253; see also Robin M.A. Weeks, Comparing Children to the Mentally
Retarded: How the Decision in Atkins v. Virginia Will Affect the Execution of
Juvenile Offenders, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 451, 479 (2003) (noting that when the Court
requires individualized culpability assessments it raises difficult definitional
questions: "What is the 'normal' adult level of culpability? How do we measure
it?").
309. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 836-37 ("[W~e currently lack the
diagnostic tools to evaluate psycho-social maturity reliably on an individualized
basis or to distinguish young career criminals from ordinary adolescents who, as
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areas of law use age-based categorical lines to approximate the
level of maturity required for particular activities-e.g., voting,
driving, and consuming alcohol-and restrict youths because of
immaturity and presumptive inability to make competent
decisions. 310
The other reason to adopt a categorical rule of youthfulness
as a mitigating factor is the inability of judges or juries to fairly
weigh that abstraction against the aggravating reality of a terrible
crime."' Roper recognized that "the brutality or cold-blooded
nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating
arguments based on youth as a matter of course, even where the
juvenile offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of
true depravity should require a sentence less severe than death.""'
The Court rightly feared that jurors could not distinguish between
a person's responsibility for causing the harm and the harm itself
when they evaluated culpability. Surveys of jurors report that the
heinousness of a crime invariably trumped a youth's immaturity.313
Although Miller/Jackson requires individualized culpability
assessments, the Court did not identify relevant factors to consider
adults, will repudiate their reckless experimentation. Litigating maturity on a
case-by-case basis is likely to be an error-prone undertaking, with the outcomes
determined by factors other than immaturity.") (citation omitted).
310. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 581-87 (providing statutory appendices listing
limits on juveniles' rights to vote, marry, and serve on a jury as a result of
immaturity); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF
ADOLESCENCE 35-36 (1982); Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice
Counterrevolution: Responding to Cognitive Dissonance in the Law's View of the
Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J. 65, 88-91 (1999) (analyzing
the inconsistency between punishing adolescents like adults while denying their
autonomy claims in areas outside of the criminal law); Richard 0. Brooks, "The
Refurbishing": Reflections Upon Law and Justice Among the Stages of Life, 54
BUFF. L. REV. 619 (2006) (noting that the designation of diminished responsibility
for juveniles is an example of our legal system's provision of legal duties and
immunities based upon stages of life); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy:
Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1268 (2000) (arguing
that presumption of decisional incapacity pervades most areas of law and conflicts
with a model of adolescent autonomy); Scott, supra note 81, at 1608, 1611; Franklin
E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity,
Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 271, 287 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz
eds., 2000).
311. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 398 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It
is thus unsurprising that individualized consideration at transfer and sentencing
has not in fact ensured that juvenile offenders lacking an adult's culpability are not
sentenced to die.").
312. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553-54.
313. Brink, supra note 77, at 1581; Simona Ghetti & Allison D. Redlish,
Reactions to Youth Crime: Perceptions of Accountability and Competency, 19
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 33, 45-47 (2001).
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when evaluating the blameworthiness of a youth.314
In light of these problems-the abstract meaning of
culpability, the inability to measure or compare the moral agency
of a youth, and the tendency to overweigh harm-state
legislatures should enact a categorical Youth Discount that gives
all adolescents fractional reductions in sentence-lengths based on
age-as-a-proxy for culpability.315 In youths' diminished
responsibility a Youth Discount recognizes that same-length
sentences exact a greater penal bite from younger offenders than
older ones.31 6 A Youth Discount would require a judge to give a
substantial reduction off of the sentence that she would impose on
an adult convicted of the same crime. A youth would need only a
birth certificate to determine the appropriate amount of discount.
The Youth Discount creates a sliding scale of diminished
responsibility and gives the largest sentence reductions to the
314. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
315. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT 315-21 (1999) (supplying a rationale for youth discount and
describing its administration); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court:
Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 68, 121-33 (1997) (providing rationale for categorical "youth
discount") [hereinafter Feld, Abolish]; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the
Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 520-28 (1987) (arguing that proportional sentencing
requires recognition of youths' reduced culpability). But see Joseph L. Hoffman, On
the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L. J. 229,
233 (1989) (describing age as an imperfect proxy for a complex of factors,
"includling] maturity, judgment, responsibility, and the capability to assess the
possible consequences of one's conduct," that constitute culpability); ZIMRING,
AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 150 (objecting to categorical youth
discount because "age is an incomplete proxy for levels of maturity during the years
from age twelve to eighteen"). Zimring argues that "[t]he variation among
individuals of the same age is great, and individualized determinations of
immaturity are thus superior to averages based on aggregate patterns." Id.
316. The Court in Miller/Jackson struck down the mandatory LWOP because
"every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every other-the 17-year-old and
the 14-year-old. . ." Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467; see Andrew von Hirsch,
Proportionate Sentences for Juveniles: How Different than for Adults?, 3
PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 221, 227 (2001) ("A given penalty is said to be more onerous
when suffered by a child than by an adult. Young people, assertedly, are
psychologically less resilient, and the punishments they suffer interfere more with
opportunities for education and personal development.") (citation omitted); see also
Arredondo, supra note 119, at 19 ("Because of differences in the experience of time,
any given duration of sanction will be experienced subjectively as longer by
younger children."); Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You:
Social and Legal Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 1, 21-22 (2002) (describing substantive quality of punishment
adolescents experience in adult incarceration as far harsher than the sanctions
they experience as delinquents); Feld, Abolish, supra note 315, at 113 ("[Youths
experience objectively equal punishment subjectively as more severe.").
20131 ADOLESCENT CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 323
youngest, least mature offenders." On a sliding scale correlated
with developmental differences of diminished responsibility, a
fourteen-year-old offender would receive a maximum sentence that
is substantially reduced from the sentence an adult would
receive-e.g., perhaps twenty or twenty-five percent the length.
On a sixteen-year-old, a judge might impose a maximum sentence
no more than half the adult length. The deeper discounts for
younger offenders correspond with their developmental differences
in maturity of judgment and self-control compared with older
youths and adults."' As Miller/Jackson foreshadow, "occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon."' A Youth Discount would preclude imposing LWOP,
lengthy mandatory-minimum, or de facto life sentences-e.g.,
lengthy terms of years stacked consecutively. 20  Shortly after
317. Feld, Abolish, supra note 315, at 118-21; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
6.11A(a) comment c. (providing that "offenders under 18 should be judged less
blameworthy for their criminal acts than older offenders and age-based mitigation
should increase in correspondence with the youthfulness of individual
defendants."); ScoTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 86,
at 231 (arguing for sentences proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and
culpability of the offender and insisting that "immaturity and the arm of the
offense should count, such that younger offenders should be punished less severely
than older youths . . . ."); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 72, at 837 ("[A] systematic
sentencing discount for young offenders in adult courtf] might satisfy the demands
of proportionality."); Zimring, supra note 310, at 288 (suggesting that the penal law
of youth crime should develop "a sliding scale of responsibility based on both
judgment and the practical experience of impulse management and peer control").
318. Brink, supra note 77, at 1572 ("[A] juvenile is less responsible for her crime
than her adult counterpart is for the same crime and that, all else being equal, the
younger the juvenile the less responsible she is for her crime."); FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 68 ("[Aldolescents learn their way toward
adult levels of responsibility gradually. This notion is also consistent with .. . long
periods of diminished responsibility that incrementally approach adult standards
in the late teens ... [and with] less-than-adult punishments that gradually
approach adult levels during the late teen years.").
319. Miller, 132, S. Ct. at 2469; see also id. at 2489 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for going "out of its way to express the view that the
imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a 'child' (i.e., a murderer under the
age of 18) should be uncommon").
320. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 8 (recommending
that states abolish LWOP sentences for crimes committed by juveniles); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 6.11A(f) (suggesting that for youth sentences "[tihe court shall have
authority to impose a sentence that deviates from any mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment"); MAUER ET AL., supra note 31, at 32 (recommending categorical
exemption of juveniles from life sentences because they "represent an entire
rejection of the longstanding traditions of our treatment of juvenile offenders,
which is that rehabilitation should be considered as a primary objective when
sentencing children"); SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra
note 86, at 246 (concluding that after Roper "youths also should be excluded from
the criminal sentence of Life Without Parole (LWOP)"); Wallace, supra note 155, at
53 (arguing that any lengthy term of year sentence denies juvenile offender a
meaningful opportunity to reenter society). Wallace argues that "[tihe rationale for
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Miller/Jackson, the California Supreme Court in People v.
Caballero found that stacked, consecutive sentences that resulted
in a 110-year-to-life sentence imposed on a juvenile convicted of
several non-homicide offenses violated Graham because parole
eligibility after 100 years did not provide the offender with "a
meaningful opportunity to . . . reenter society in the future. 21
"[Slentencing a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense to a
term of years with a parole eligibility date that falls outside the
juvenile offender's natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment....
[Tihe state may not deprive them at sentencing of a meaningful
opportunity to demonstrate their rehabilitation and fitness to
reenter society in the future."322 Similarly, a lengthy mandatory
minimum sentence imposed on a juvenile may violate
Miller/Jackson's injunction that the sentence take account of
youthfulness as a mitigating factor.' Because the length of a
LWOP sentence is indeterminate, states should apply a Youth
Discount to a presumptive life sentence length of about forty
years-i.e., the average age at which adult murderers enter prison
and their projected, albeit reduced, life expectancy. 324 Apart from
the Court's categorical abolishment of life without parole, however, also supports
abolishing lengthy term of year sentences, both with and without parole eligibility.
. . . [A] sentence of forty, fifty, or sixty years received at age sixteen will still yield
the same problem-a disproportionate amount of time served." Id. at 60.
321. People v. Caballero, 55 Cal. 4th 262, 268 (2012). In Caballero, the
defendant was convicted of three counts of attempted first degree murder plus a
consecutive term for firearm enhancement, all of which were stacked consecutively
to yield a sentence of 110-years-to-life. The California Supreme Court rejected the
state's claim that cumulative sentences that were not explicitly designated as life
without parole did not violate Graham's categorical rule with respect to juvenile
non-homicide offenders. Id. at 266-67.
322. Id. at 268. In setting a date for parole eligibility, the Caballero court noted
that:
Under Graham's nonhomicide ruling, the sentencing court must consider
all mitigating circumstances attendant in the juvenile's crime and life,
including but not limited to his or her chronological age at the time of the
crime, whether the juvenile offender was a direct perpetrator or an aider
and abettor, and his or her physical and mental development, so that it
can impose a time when the juvenile offender will be able to seek parole
from the parole board.
Id. at 268-69.
323. See, e.g., Nilsen, supra note 188, at 69. Nilsen argues that:
The expansion of an individualized sentencing requirement from the death
penalty to life without parole for juveniles calls into question any
mandatory minimum sentencing for juveniles, because by definition such
sentences do not afford any discretion to the sentence based on individual
characteristics of the offender, then or in the future.
Id.
324. See Alfonso A. Castillo, Guilty Plea in Gruesome Murder Deal Slammed,
NEWSDAY, Sep. 13, 2007, at A4 (noting that life expectancy of prison inmates is
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adolescents' diminished responsibility, the likelihood of recidivism
decreases with age while the costs of confining geriatric inmates
increase substantially." The specific amount by which to
substantially discount sentences for youths is a political and
legislative value choice. Although some legislators may find it
tempting to engage in penal demagoguery,32 6 states can achieve
their legitimate penal goals by sentencing youths to no more than
twenty or twenty-five years for even the most serious crimes.32
The principle of the Youth Discount is supported by
professional organizations and academic analysts." The
shorter than that of the civilian population "because of unhealthy living conditions
and violefice"). Cf. Ernest Drucker, Population Impact of Mass Incarceration Under
New York's Rockefeller Drug Laws, 79 J. URBAN HEALTH 5 (2002) (discussing the
reduced life expectancies of prisoners in New York convicted of non-violent drug
offenses); see also Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Sentencing in Homicide
Cases and the Role of Vengeance, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 363, 367 (2003) (summarizing
data on murder cases in thirty-three large urban counties). Data from the United
States Department of Justice reports that over half (52.7%) of all homicide
offenders committed their crimes between ages eighteen and thirty-four. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S.,
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htius.pdf (graph entitled "Homicide Type by
Age, 1976-2005") (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). Although the average life expectancy
for children born today is 77.8 years, it is lower for men, for minorities, and
significantly reduced for prison inmates who are exposed to a variety of diseases.
See, e.g., ELIZABETH ARIAS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NAT. VITAL STATISTICS
REP.: U.S. LIFE TABLES, 2003, at 3 (last modified Mar. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/RevisedTables_2003.pdf.
325. AMNESTY INT'L & HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 16, at 81-85; LABELLE,
supra note 240, at 22; NELLIS, supra note 174, at 33 (2012) (noting that before
LWOP inmates grow old and die in prison, "they will require substantially greater
health care and medical services. Thus, life sentences add to the rising geriatric
prison population and place heavy financial burdens on states").
326. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 20, at 1538-39
(describing the politicization of crime policies, politician's use of racial code words
for electoral advantage, and the substitution of sound-bites-"adult crime, adult
time"-for responsible legislation).
327. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.11A(g) (providing that "[n]o sentence of
imprisonment longer than [25] years may be imposed for any offense or
combination of offenses. For offenders under the age of 16 at the time of
commission of their offenses, no sentences of imprisonment longer that [20] years
may be imposed. For offenders under the age of 14 at the time of commission of
their offenses, no sentence of imprisonment longer than [101 years may be
imposed.").
328. Several academic analysts have explicitly endorsed my proposal for the
Youth Discount. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.11A reporter's note
(acknowledging that the framework of the MPC's recommendation for "specialized
sentencing rules and mitigated treatment of juvenile offenders sentenced in adult
courts, owes much" to Feld's proposal for a Youth Discount-"a sliding scale of
developmental and criminal responsibility"); ScoTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING
JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 86, at 246 (concluding that "[piroportionality
supports imposing statutory limits on the maximum duration of adult sentences
imposed] on juveniles-a 'youth discount,' to use Feld's term."); Tanenhaus &
Drizin, supra note 223, at 698 ("We endorse Feld's proposals [for a youth discount]
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American Bar Association condemned LWOP sentences for
juveniles and endorsed the principle that sentences for juveniles
should be less than those imposed on adults, should formally
recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor, and should provide
for earlier parole release consideration. 32 ' The American Law
Institute's revised Model Penal Code (MPC) sentencing provisions
explicitly adopted the principle of the Youth Discount. The MPC
provides that when states sentence offenders convicted of crimes
committed prior to the age of eighteen, "the offender's age shall be
presumed a mitigating factor, to be assigned greater weight for
offenders of younger ages."03 ' The MPC recommends that
sentencing and correctional authorities give priority to young
offenders "rehabilitation and reintegration into the law-abiding
community" and that judges have authority to impose blended
sentences which give youths access to juvenile programs rather
than to prison."'
because they respect the notion that juveniles are developmentally different than
adults and that these differences make juveniles both less culpable for their crimes
and less deserving of the harsh sanctions, which now must be imposed on serious
and violent adult offenders."); von Hirsch, supra note 316, at 226-27 (arguing for
categorical penalty reductions based on juveniles' reduced culpability).
While actual appreciation of consequences varies highly among youths of
the same age, the degree of appreciation we should demand depends on
age: we may rightly expect more comprehension and self-control from the
17-year-old than a 14-year-old, so that the 17-year-old's penalty reduction
should be smaller. Assessing culpability on the basis of individualized
determinations of a youth's degree of moral development would be neither
feasible nor desirable.
Id. at 226. A study group funded by the National Institute of Justice determined
that "[y]ouths' diminished responsibility requires mitigated sanctions to avoid
permanently life-changing penalties and provide room to reform." James C.
Howell, Barry C. Feld & Daniel P. Mears, Young Offenders and an Effective Justice
System Response, in ROLF LOEBER & DAVID P. FARRINGTON, FROM JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND
PREVENTION 213 (2012). Following the rationale of Roper and Graham, it
concluded that "[a] categorical rule of youthfulness as a mitigating factor in
sentencing is preferable to individualized discretion." Id. at 229.
329. ABA, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION #105C, at 6-9 (2008), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migratedleadership/2008/midyear/up
dated-reports/hundredfivec.authcheckdam.doc.
330. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.11A(a).
331. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.11A(b). Blended sentencing provisions allow a
criminal court judge to impose a juvenile sentence in lieu of a criminal disposition
or to stay imposition of a criminal sentence pending successful completion of a
juvenile commitment. See BARRY C. FELD & DONNA M. BISHOP, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 806 (2012) (explaining
variations of blended sentencing provisions); Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld,
The Back-door to Prison: Waiver Reform, "Blended Sentencing," and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 91 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 997, 1028-30 (describing
net-widening effects of juvenile blended sentencing, but approving criminal court
blended sentencing alternatives). The MPC proposes that a criminal court judge
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Although a small subset of chronic offenders may pose a
heightened risk of future recidivism, Roper observed that "it is
difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption."32 Similarly, Graham and Miller/Jackson
recognized the inability of judges to identify those high-risk
individuals at the time of their trial and conviction.' This
difficulty is compounded by the inability of adolescents to
participate effectively in criminal proceedings designed for
adults."' Moreover, proportionality is a retributive concept, not a
utilitarian one,"' and the Court decided Roper, Graham, and
Miller/Jackson firmly on retributive grounds-reduced
culpability--even after examining the relevant utilitarian
justifications for punishment.' Accordingly, there is no basis on
which to disregard the categorical mitigating role of youthfulness
at sentencing to incapacitate some youths who may be deemed to
be life-course persistent offenders."'
Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson emphasized that
juveniles' personalities are more transitory and less-fixed, their
crimes provide less reliable evidence of "irretrievably depraved
character," and that "a greater possibility exists that a minor's
character deficiencies will be reformed."" Because adolescence is
may impose any disposition that would have been available if the offender had been
adjudicated delinquent for the same conduct in the juvenile court. Alternatively,
the court may impose a juvenile-court disposition while reserving power to impose
an adult sentence if the offender violates the conditions of the juvenile-court
disposition. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.11A(d).
332. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
333. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011, 2042 (2010).
334. Grisso et al., supra note 180, at 334-35.
335. See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011).
336. See Youngjae Lee, supra note 143, at 59 (noting that the Court in Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), struck down the death penalty for rape while
acknowledging that "it may measurably serve the legitimate ends of punishment
and therefore is not invalid for its failure to do so").
337. But see MODEL PENAL CODE §6.11A(c) (providing that "[w]hen an offender
has been convicted of a serious violent offense, and there is a reliable basis for
belief that the offender presents a high risk of serious violent offending in the
future, the court may give priority may to the goal of incapacitation . . ."). MODEL
PENAL CODE comment c. recognizes utilitarian sentencing goals-incapacitation-
as a basis on which to override the mitigation due adolescents' diminished
responsibility. While a small subset of serious and chronic offenders may be at
heightened risk of future offending, courts lack valid or reliable bases on which to
predict future dangerousness. Id.
338. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005). See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at
327
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a period of rapid growth and transition, we can expect youths to
change more quickly and to a greater degree in the years following
an offense than more hardened, older offenders.' Although rates
of criminal behavior increase rapidly among males in their teenage
years, rates of desistance are equally high as youths mature into
their early twenties.4 o States should avoid the iatrogenic
consequences of immediately incarcerating more malleable young
offenders with adult offenders."'
A Youth Discount enables young offenders to survive serious
mistakes with the possibility of reconstructing their lives.34 2  We
can hold juveniles accountable, manage the risks they pose to
others, and provide them with "a meaningful opportunity to
reform," without extinguishing their lives.' The characteristics of
2026; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring).
339. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 82 (observing that
"the high prevalence of offenses in the teen years and the rather high rates of
incidence for those who offend are transitory phenomena associated with a
transitional status and life period"). Because some degree of criminal offending is
normal for adolescents, major interventions may not be necessary to change them
and punitive sanctions may be counter-productive. Id.
340. See, e.g., SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 14, at 71 (noting that "most of
the youth who reported committing an assault in the later juvenile years stopped
the behavior, reporting none in the early adult years"). Criminologists have noted
the phenomenon of adolescents' "spontaneous" desistance from delinquency for
decades. See, e.g., MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, ROBERT M. FIGLIO & THORSTEN SELLIN,
DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 160-63 (1972) (reporting that almost half of
youths desisted after a single offense, one-third desisted after a second offense, and
the seriousness of the present offense was not predictive of the next offense); PAUL
E. TRACY, MARVIN E. WOLFGANG & ROBERT M. FIGLIO, DELINQUENCY CAREERS IN
Two BIRTH COHORTS 104 tbl.8.3 (1990) (reporting that forty-two percent of youths
desisted after one offense and an additional twenty-eight percent desisted after a
second offense).
341. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §6.11A comment j. (recommending prohibition
on housing juveniles in adult institutions).
Youths are especially vulnerable to victimization in adult institutions, and
are at greater risk than adult inmates of psychological harm and suicide.
They are often in need of age-specific programming that is unavailable in
adult institutions. Research indicates that incarceration in adult prison
substantially increases the risk that a young person will reoffend in the
future.
Id. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth
Violence, 24 CRIME & JUSTICE 189 (1998) (noting that most states do not provide
age-segregated dispositional facilities for youths convicted as adults); see also
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 118 (2001) (reporting that "young people placed in adult
correctional institutions, compared to those placed in institutions designed for
youths, are eight time as likely to commit suicide, five times as likely to be sexually
assaulted, twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and 50 percent as likely to be
attacked with a weapon") (citations omitted).
342. See Franklin E. Zimring, Background Paper, in CONFRONTING YOUTH
CRIME 27, at 66-69 (1978).
343. See ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, supra note 21, at 49-83, 142-45;
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youth that increase their propensity for wrongdoing-immaturity
and plasticity-also provide the mechanisms for learning, growth,
and change. The adolescent who committed a crime at fourteen or
fifteen years of age is a very different person than the adult
incarcerated decades later. Because young offenders eventually
will return to the community, states should provide them with
resources then require them to demonstrate maturity and
rehabilitation.
Conclusion
Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson's reduced culpability and
diminished responsibility rationale provides the bases to
categorically recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in
sentencing. Adolescents lack the judgment, appreciation of
consequences, and self-control of adults, and they deserve shorter
sentences when they cause the same harms. Their personalities
are in transition and it is unjust and irrational to continue harshly
punishing a fifty- or sixty-year-old person for a crime that an
irresponsible child committed many decades earlier.'"
Roper and Graham's categorical holdings provide the
rationale for a Youth Discount when criminal courts sentence
young offenders. The Court used age as a proxy for culpability
because no better, more reliable or accurate bases exist on which
to individualize sentences. Culpability is a normative construct; it
is not an objective thing. Proportioning sentences to culpability
involves a moral judgment about deserved punishment, and there
is nothing that clinicians, jurors, or judges can measure or
quantify to determine how much culpability a young offender
possesses. Roper and Graham feared that efforts to individualize
and refine culpability judgments when no objective bases exist on
which to do so would introduce a systematic bias-youthfulness
might function as an aggravating, rather than mitigating, factor.
A substantial Youth Discount of the sentences imposed on adults
provides a sliding scale of severity that corresponds with the
increasingly diminished responsibility of younger offenders. A
Youth Discount provides a reasonable approximation of "what any
parent knows"-kids are different and engage in stupid and
dangerous behavior because they are kids.
Zimring, Toward a Jurisprudence of Youth Violence, supra note 128, at 490-93.
344. Streib & Schrempp, supra note 28, at 12 ("To decide today whether or not
this adolescent offender should continue to be imprisoned into those adult years
and even into old age is to assume extrahuman powers to predict human behavior
generations into the future.").
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Legislators must exhibit political courage to enact laws that
benefit easily demonized groups, such as serious young offenders.
They must demonstrate even greater political courage or their
opponent may charge them with being "soft on crime." During the
crime-panic of the 1990s, politicians over-reacted and passed get-
tough waiver and criminal sentencing laws that are irrational,
inhumane, unjust, and counterproductive. They are responsible to
restore rationality, humanity, and decency to juvenile and
sentencing laws. Public opinion supports policies to rehabilitate
serious young offenders rather than simply to incarcerate them for
longer periods.4 ' Greater understanding of adolescent
development, positive public support for less punitive policies, and
low crime rates may strengthen legislators' resolve to promote just
and sensible youth crime policies.3 46
345. BARRY KRISBERG & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, ATTITUDES OF U.S. VOTERS
TOWARD YOUTH CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2007), available at
http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication-pdf/focus-voters-and-
youth.pdf (reporting strong public support for rehabilitation as a strategy to
prevent and reduce juvenile crime); Brink, supra note 77, at 1585 ("[T]here is
support for treating youthful offenders as juveniles and for sentencing that is
rehabilitative. . . ."); Daniel S. Nagin et al., Public Preferences for Rehabilitation
Versus Incarceration of Juvenile Offenders: Evidence from a Contingent Valuation
Survey, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 627, 644 (2006) ("[M]embers of the public are
concerned about youth crime and want to reduce its incidence, but they are ready
to support effective rehabilitative programs as a means of accomplishing that end-
and indeed favor this response to imposing more punishment through longer
sentences.").
346. Donna M. Bishop, Public Opinion and Juvenile Justice Policy.: Myths and
Misconceptions, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 653, 656-57 (2006) (summarizing
survey results of public opinion regarding support for rehabilitation); Francis T.
Cullen, It's Time to Reaffirm Rehabilitation, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 665,
666-68 (2006) (reporting the continuing public support for the idea of
rehabilitation, and offering that rehabilitation provides a cultural and
criminological alternative to simply locking up offenders); Nagin et al., supra note
345, at 645-46.
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